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CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Table of Contents

Table of Contents. 2

Introduction. 3

The Scottish Parliament Building Project Overview.. 3

Project Schedule Delay. 4

Project Cost Over-Run. 5

Roles of Project Management 6

Strategic Project Management 8

Lessons Learned from Scottish Parliament Building Project Failure. 9

The Crossrail Delay. 10

Problems with London’s Crossrail Project 11

Warning Signs that Existed in the Crossrail Project 13

Lessons Learned. 15

Building a New Terminal at Southend Airport 15

Key Assumptions. 16

Articulated Risks for the New Terminal at Southend Airport 16

Procurement Options for the New Terminal at Southend Airport 17

Conclusion. 20

References. 21

Introduction

            Over the past years, most of the massive constructions involving public building projects have failed. This is the case despite the fact that they are initiated by the government. An example of such projects is the Scottish Parliament. It was criticized severely for the resulting cost over-run and major delay that took place in the final handing over process. This led to the lack of fulfilment of the project objectives that disappointed the stakeholders. Another current example features the Crossrail delay. The project failed to be delivered at the expected time. Meaning that its opening would have to be pushed to months later. From the lessons learnt in these two projects, it is evident that project management techniques should have been applied. It would have ensured that the projects were delivered on time, and within the set budget. The last five decades have been characterised by a lot of Research and Development in the field of Project Management with the aim of improving performance of projects in the construction field. Unfortunately, more projects are still failing since the right strategies are not being employed.

The Scottish Parliament Building Project Overview

            The Scottish Parliament building is located 1km East of Edinburg city centre. The piece of land measures 1.6 ha, and it is right at the edge of the Old Tow that is constructed used steel, oak, and granite (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 2). The new Scottish Parliament features a very complex building that has been constructed using high quality materials, and some highly unusual designs. It was procured using the Construction Management Procurement, meaning that most of the project risks fall on the client. The initial cost estimate was £50 million in July, 1997 (The Holyrood Inquiry 2004, p. 5). However, the eventual project cost  turned out to be £414 million when it was completed in August 2004 (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 8). This was a 42 month delay that led to a total trade contracts of 58 numbers. The project failure was experienced in terms of increased costs, time, and stakeholder expectations. However, the final product still met a high quality criteria that was welcomed by the millions of Scottish citizens and visitors.

Project Schedule Delay

            The main cause of the schedule delay for this project were the delays in providing the detailed design that was required. The project was quite challenging, but it still had a deadline that was set against an unrealistic timeframe. In addition to this, the procurement path was quite unusual since it featured a construction management route. Lastly, there were many interruptions in information supply throughout the course of the project. Communication problems were experienced among the team members, and many political interventions worsened the situation (Ahmad, Habibah Arshad and Ruzaini Syed Aris 2018, p. 66). The client required an additional net usable area. This required an extended design period as the architect had to issue thousands of design changes. Also, the architect was under so much pressure to deliver under the unrealistic deadlines that were being suggested by the client.

            In every construction project, effective communication is very important as it will ensure that the delivery is on schedule. This specific aspect was missing in the Scottish Parliament Building Project. The project architects were from completely different cultures (The Holyrood Inquiry 2004, p. 60). They were also working from their own independent locations, rather than the same office setting. These features worsened the communication problems that were being experienced at the Holyrood Site (Panadès-Estruch 2017, p. 213). On 1^st June, 1999, the client changed from the SPCB (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 10). There was an introduction of a presiding officer and architectural advisor. This change introduced additional communication problems to the project which was already suffering.

            The selection of construction management for the project was also a big mistake that was made. In the Scottish Construction Industry, this was very unusual since other projects had not considered a similar approach. Its advantages and disadvantages were not reviewed by the clients beforehand, even though the project at hand was quite complicated (Ferrando 2016, n.p). Some of the disadvantages of this procurement route which contributed to the schedule delay are as follows. Construction management does not feature any main contractor, hence the client has to carry all the risks of activities. This includes the activities of the 58 individual contractors who were deployed at the site (White & Sidhu 2005, p.10). Hence, the contractors ended up disrupting and delaying each other.

            Second, the construction management only focuses on coordination roles between the contractors, the clients, and the architects. It does not assume any other risks aside from negligence, thereby putting the client as risk carrier once again (Sandi et al. 2020, n.p). That is because the client had the responsibility of handling the coordination of the design, and was the one held responsible for delays and disruptions that would be triggered by trade contractors.

            Lastly, the final project cost could not be concluded until the last work package was provided. Unfortunately, the political interventions that happened frequently put a lot of pressure on the architects and trade contractors leading to further delays.

Project Cost Over-Run

            The main reasons as to why the project cost kept increase was due to the prolonged timeframes. This was caused by delays, disruptions between contractors and architects, inflation, and client management. Time is very important during projects, since the longer it takes, the more expensive it becomes. The completion of the Scottish Parliament Building project was prolonged until August 2004 (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 11). It resulted in extra costs being spent on site general requirements. In addition, after the 9/11 attack, it was paramount that public buildings should have heightened security features. Hence, the required changes ended up contributing towards the cost over-run. Another contributor was the extra variations for high level design development which took place in September 2000 and resulted in an additional £80 million (The Holyrood Inquiry 2004, p. 179). It also triggered another delay and increased the complexity of the process.

            The increased building scale, construction costs and other extra costs, along with the fees paid to advisors and site organizations are some of the other triggers of the cost over-run. For most contracts, the approximated cost goes beyond the expected cost plan allowance by a huge percentage (Loosemore 2016, p. 135). This is because of an absence of competitive procurement of contracts that have scope uncertainty. The extra works, landscaping, site acquisition, and the program contingency costs only contributed to a small increase in project cost (See figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Project Costs

Roles of Project Management

            Project management features the use of knowledge, skills, tools, and even techniques to project activities with an aim of achieving the project requirements. The success of a project is always directly linked to time, cost, quality, scope, and the extent of the risk. AS analysed above, it is evident that the Scottish Parliament building project failed due to time and costs. The project cost increased by over £350 million with a delay of 42 months (The Holyrood Inquiry 2004, p. 239). This was because the scope and risk of the project could not be managed effectively. However, the expected quality was achieved. Choosing the construction management procurement without having a basic understanding of it’s said advantaged and disadvantages greatly impacted the construction process. It represents a failure of the project management roles. It was not a suitable option for the project given the fact that it transfers most of the risk to the client. Also, it was not in line with the complexity of the project and could not enable the management of the many subcontractors (Sarhan et al. 2018, n.p). Basically, it only focused on management and coordination alone.

            Additionally, the longer the construction manager was handling the project, the extra he earned. This gives an opportunity for extortion using the project. This construction manager was excluded from the shortlisted applicants, but later on he got the role through his political influence. It shows that he is not an honest and trustworthy individual for the role that he was awarded. The key stakeholders were clearly left out of the decision making process (Sandi et al. 2020, n.p). They were not involved in making decisions with regards to procurement, neither were they consulted on the revised budget and scope changes. This is what triggered the lack of monitoring and accountability in the construction process.

            Communication was not proper between the key players including project architects. The lead architect was working out of the country, rather than be actively present at the location of the construction project. During the stages of a project’s design development cycle, Value Engineering (VE) exercise is conducted to give the stakeholders an opportunity to be involved in the process and make any require decisions. It is meant to save costs by avoiding a waste of time and resources, in the event that something will need to be changed (Telles & Ølykke 2017, p. 238). VE examines all the available options for the design and construction of a project. Hence, the design brief and identification of the budget constraints can be easily refined. In relation to the Scottish Parliament Building project, the VE exercise led to the suggestion of various recommendations which could have led to the saving of at least £25 million (The Holyrood Inquiry 2004, p. 209). Unfortunately, the following new design variations made it impossible.

Strategic Project Management

            If a strategic project management approach could have been considered, the failed project outcomes could have been minimized if not completely avoided. Strategic project management is described as a clear project perspective, direction, and guidelines on what should be done, and how it should be carried out, in order to achieve the best competitive advantage and project results. It provides the project team with the necessary tools for delivering the project. At the beginning of the project, the following strategic frameworks should have been considered to reduce cost over-run and delays.

            First, there should have been strategic alignment of projects. It implies that the project objectives should be properly aligned with the client organization goals. This could have been achieved if there was a well-defined leadership structure and its complete inclusion in the project from the start. Second, a project management culture should have been cultivated early on. The project management techniques knowledge could have been improved through employee training. This would have created a sense of responsibility and understanding among the team members (Telles & Ølykke 2017, p. 240). It would make the accountable for their roles in the project. Third, projects and outcomes should be tracked and measured. Unfortunately, in the Scottish Parliament Project, tracking and measuring the deliverables was poorly done. The constantly increasing design variations made it impossible to properly perform this task. Fourth, communication should be promoted through open channels. The communication between teams working on the Scottish Parliament building project was not free flowing (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 14). In project management, effective communication ensures that information is shared effectively, thereby saving a lot of time that could be wasted while going back and forth for clarifications. If these techniques could have been employed, the project would have saved a lot of cost and time wasted.

Lessons Learned from Scottish Parliament Building Project Failure

            When reflecting back on a project, it will take time to determine whether it succeeded or not. The new Scottish Parliament building was clearly a failed project due to the extra costs incurred and months of delay in completion. However, later on, it has turned out to be quite a success as a postmodern architectural achievement. After it was opened in 2004, this building attracted over a quart of a million visitors to the region (White & Sidhu 2005, p. 18). Within a year, it became recognised as the country’s leading tourist attraction site. After a project is completed, the financial strain stops, and many tend to forget the chaos and disappointments associated with the development process. However, it is important to always reflect back on the issues and derive some lessons learned for future use.

            In this project, the first lesson relates to the procurement route. The selected procurement rule should be one that will allow parties who can manage the risks that are involved. It should be based on a criterion that transfers risk from one party to another. The construction management approach allocates all the risks on the client (Sarhan et al. 2018, n.p). In this case, the client has no construction experience at all.  The second lesson revolves around milestones. Milestones are important because they enable the progress to be measured. This should be done for the whole project to enable the identification of possible problem areas, and consideration of solutions beforehand. This will help in saving time as corrections are introduced before other steps can start.

            The third lesson learned is all about communication and leadership. The current project lacked a clear leadership as evidenced by the constant change of the client, project sponsors, directors, and even the appointment and resignation of project managers. Multiple clients had opposing views, hence they could not effectively manage the project. If there was a single leader, the flow of the project could be swift since decision making could have been centralized (Panadès-Estruch 2017, p. 212). Fourth, budgeting needs to be handled with care. The Scottish Parliament building budget was not sufficient. That is because the initial budget was meant for extending an existing building, which was later changed to feature a new building altogether. Hence, the budget was not in line with the intended building. It was not realistic since more material, labour, and time would be needed. The design was also incomplete and design brief was also unclear.

            Fifth, when starting a project, it is imperative that realistic expectations are set to enable proper planning. This is particularly important for complex and risky projects, or in cases where a tight schedule for completion exists. Since there was political intervention and an urgency for a parliament building, the set timeframe was very short and unrealistic (Kabirifar & Mojtahedi 2019, p. 15). Hence, there was not enough time to revise the design and additional scope of work. Construction projects need proper planning and monitoring in order to succeed. It is important to also avoid the political interferences in the project process and decision making. The project funding and resources should be secured through other routes.

The Crossrail Delay

            London’s £17.6 billion Crossrail project was supposed to have been completed by December 2018 (Gardiner 2019, n.p). It has been running behind schedule for a very long time, yet there is still no clue as to when it will be completed. It is currently burning £30 million every week as it struggles to finalize. When it was first announced that the deadline for December, 2018 could be delayed, a lot of blame was put on the requirement for complex signalling systems that were crucial for the trains’ safety (Gardiner 2019, n.p). However, documents and public testimonies that were shared by the current and former executives are a reflection of the problems which have been challenging the UK construction industry for many years. There are half-built stations everywhere with no set dates for completion. Productivity is also very poor. Unfortunately, sufficient information on this project is lacking since it is a sensitive project where many firms are employed under. Thus, it is difficult to find people who are willing to openly talk about the Crossrail’s situation in public.

Problems with London’s Crossrail Project

            The main problem that has been identified is civils strife. Ever since it was announced that there would be delays in 2018, most of the focus has turned to blaming one another. Sir Terry Morgan, who was the former chair and Sadiq Khan, the mayor resorted to arguments of whether the mayor had already learnt of the delay before December (Gardiner 2019, n.p). Their debate, however, seems to be missing the bigger issue, which is what actually happened to make the project to fail (Kabirifar & Mojtahedi 2019, p. 15). Also, it does not look into how the delay was expected despite the knowledge of the project managers. According to Stan Hornagold, the project manager, whether the major knew in July or August, it still makes no difference since the project is already a year late (Gardiner 2019, n.p).

            Initially, in 2010, the main civil engineering works on the project were flowing smoothly (Gardiner 2019, n.p). This started to change after the complex M&E equipment started being installed. For example, the equipment had to be replaced in various stations. In February 2017, the construction union Unite had branded the Crossrail as “hokey cokey line” since the equipment which was being installed ended up being removed (Gardiner 2019, n.p). The project was even described as “in meltdown” and the productivity as “in pieces” since early January 2017 (Gardiner 2019, n.p). This shows that there were signs implying that problems were being experienced.

            Unfortunately, he maintained that the project was still running on schedule and within budget, and that it would be completed as expected. The dishonesty and lack of open communication is a problem that has majorly affected the delivery on this project (Kafile & Fore 2018, n.p). The same issue was also experienced in the Scottish Parliament building project where team members were not communicating properly with one another, and with the stakeholders. For the Crossrail project, the urge to lie about the status of the project seems to have been based on the fact that the initial stages were all quite successful (Gardiner 2019, n.p). The team that was involved in the project wanted to maintain this reputation.

            The Transport for London had to be pressured by the London Assembly to release documents which showed that the civil delays, as well as the delays in the delivery of trains, are what led to the squeezed timelines for the signalling installation, integration, and testing programs (Ghadamsi & Braimah 2016, p. 18). Hence, the scheduling issue that was also experienced during the Scottish Parliament building. The lack of proper planning and a lot of interference has greatly impacted both of these projects. According to a letter from the chief executive of signalling contractor Siemens, the delay in signalling system installation was due to problems related to civils and energisation contractors (Gardiner 2019, n.p). This led to a delay by a year, while another 18 month delay meant that the available testing window was now only 5 months. It was at this point that the chief executive suggested that it was time to finally be open about the issues and the expected delays. Unfortunately, the same was not made public just yet. It took another 6 months of secrecy before the announcement was made.

            Lack of open communication tends to impact construction projects significantly. That is because the stakeholders who should be involved in the decision making are not even made aware of the problems being experienced (Torvinen & Haukipuro 2017, p. 1449). Therefore, instead of saving time and resources by taking action immediately, the project team waited until the failure was already experienced when the delay had to be announced. So many months have been lost already in the project, and more resources are still needed to see it through completion (Gardiner 2019, n.p). For the Crossrail project, it is evident that there were some stations where a lot of challenges were being experienced, such as the Paddington and Bond Street stations.

            Since the testing timetable was now squeezed, there was a need to remove civil contractors off the project in order to allow the trains to travel through the tunnels. They adopted a project of five construction days and two days of testing. Unfortunately, the testing was not very successful, and the construction that needed to be done was still a lot (Gardiner 2019, n.p). Thus, it was decided that it is best to compromise on construction work. Yet again, this decision was made without the inclusion of the stakeholders, showing that there was a lack of a clear leadership hierarchy.

Warning Signs that Existed in the Crossrail Project

            Before a project can have negative outcomes, there must have been some warning signs that were ignored. First, the timeframe given for the completion of this project was unrealistic. It is indicated that many people who were on the ground already had doubts on the opening date 18 months before (Gardiner 2019, n.p). The latest time for starting the dynamic testing should have been back in early 2018. Therefore, when this did not happen, it was already apparent that there would be a delay. Signalling systems and testing problems are all interrelated. Also, it is impossible to do the signalling installation while doing dynamic train testing.

            This finding shows that the performance of specific individuals playing different roles in the project are questionable. The US consultant Jacobs, who is the project representative, has been highly questioned (Gardiner 2019, n.p). He was supposed to follow up on the project and give feedback to the project sponsors. In May, he reported to the Joint Sponsor Board that the project was undergoing so much pressure and was in need of an additional £400 million (Gardiner 2019, n.p). He did not mention that the delivery date was in jeopardy, thereby showing that he intentionally hid the truth from his employers. In addition, Crossrail’s own report also highlighted the December delivery date as “green” and not “at risk” as it should have. This is quite disappointing since there were 25 flagged warnings on specific deliverables such as dynamic testing, trial runs, and infrastructure provision.

            Thus, if the project representative was relying on the information that was being given to him by Crossrail, it may have impacted the final message that was conveyed to the Board. This represents the importance of open communication and transparency. It prevented the problems that were there from being recognized and addressed in a timely manner. On the contrary, the parts of the organization were being winded down in preparation for completion (Gardiner 2019, n.p). This was the wrong decision given the fact that the project was nowhere near completion. Instead, it was suffering as there was too much to be done in a very short time. Communication between project leaders and the team was not efficient. It seems that the project team was not communicating openly with the senior management team (Wondimu et al. 2018, p. 357). In addition, there was no effective monitoring of project milestones. The leaders were getting the kind of pleasing feedback that they hoped for. Consequently, no one took the initiative to countercheck and ensure everything was accurate.

            It can be assumed that the right environment was not established by the leadership. Thus, the team members were always scared of openly discussing any challenges that were being experienced. The need for additional funding may have been necessitated by the additional days which would be required to complete the project. In addition, the constant installation and replacement of equipment was also a great loss financially.

Lessons Learned

            The extent of the failure to recognize a problem in the project is only becoming quite evident. It is now clear how far behind the project was due to the compromise on construction to allow for dynamic testing. The new chief executive of Crossrail acknowledged that in January 2019, none of the nine stations was complete. Only two stations are nearing completion which means they can now demobilize the workers. This is expected to reduce the cost of £30 million weekly (Gardiner 2019, n.p). However, it cannot be possible until August. This was the first time that Crossrail project team has actually aligned with its contractors in terms of dates. The chief executive also admitted that low productivity is being experienced (Wondimu et al. 2018, p. 360). This means that very little work is being done, and that if this is not improved, the results will be catastrophic once again.

            Despite these challenges, it is expected that after the project is completed, the final product will be of a high quality. That will allow the public to forget these problems being experienced currently. It is also a complex project that was not assigned sufficient resources, and a reasonable deadline. Most projects that are this complex tend to experience overruns among other challenges.

Building a New Terminal at Southend Airport

            Considering the two projects that have been analysed, it is clear that construction in the UK faces similar challenges that must be anticipated and prepared for when handling future projects. It is expected that similar problems may occur when working on the construction of a new terminal at Southend Airport. The current budget for the project is £400 million.

Key Assumptions

            It is assumed that the new terminal should be completed by the deadline set, which is in January, 2023. The airport has recorded a sudden surge in the number of travellers following a cessation of the travel ban that was introduced in 2020. Thus, it is expected that the people who will be travelling over the next year will be many. The design scope and construction work feature a combination of the new terminal with the existing parts of the airport. The project deliverables feature a 21,500 m² terminal area, 10 departing gates, a luggage reclaim areas, and operation areas. An external consultancy was hired to represent the client’s interests.

Articulated Risks for the New Terminal at Southend Airport

            When carrying out the construction project, a major risk to look out for relates to the budget and delays. The project is massive and quite complex. Therefore, just as is the trend with other similar projects, there is a likelihood that this project will experience cost overruns. The set deadline is not realistic given the state of the project. Thus, if care is not taken, an outcome that is similar to the Scottish Parliament building or the Crossrail may be experienced. There may be various design changes which may delay the progress since construction cannot start without the designs. In addition, the chief executive may showcase characteristics that represent him as a fraudster. For instance, rather than following through to ensure that the construction is finalized in a timely manner, he may choose to delay it further. The more the project delays, the more extra payment he will get.

            Second, in such a big project, the various stakeholders may end up delaying the project further due to specific disagreements. Contractual agreements tend to hinder collaboration in a project since each contractor will focus on individual benefits. The project client, their external consultancy team, and the contractors may start a blame game if the project does not perform as expected (Ghadamsi & Braimah 2016, p. 19). Thus, collaboration and transparency may not be experienced. Hence, the stakeholders may keep the actual status of the project from one another, and also from the sponsors. Since communication may be impacted, there is a risk of failing to acknowledge problems until the last minute. This means that the stakeholders will not know that there was a problem with the project until last minute.

            There is also a risk of too many design changes that may be initiated by the project client or his representative. In many instances, this cannot be avoided since it is still in the design stage. Unfortunately, once the construction process has begun, it may mean that any changes are represented by losses (Kafile & Fore 2018, n.p). For example, during testing, certain equipment may fail to work as required, meaning that the design may have to be altered.

Procurement Options for the New Terminal at Southend Airport

            An airport procurement project is quite complex. First, it is highly significant for the public. Therefore, many people will be following the progress closely. Second, the activities involved in the process are very many. Unfortunately, the projects are often assigned critical timeframes to ensure that the airport is back on track as soon as possible without distractions. There are also many stakeholders including contractors, the client, consultants, architects and many others. (See figure 2). 

Figure 2: Airport Construction Project Characteristics

            Considering the characteristics identified above, it is clear that the procurement option for this project is the Design and Build (See figure 3). Both activities will be handled by the current contractor. This route enables the client to be involved in the entire process right from the start. It ensures that the client needs and goals will be met just as they expected (Kabirifar & Mojtahedi 2019, p. 15). Thus, clients need to give ample time for the contractors to prepare for the requirements set.

Figure 3: Phases of Project Procurement

            The design and build contractor carries most of the project risk. Thus, the risk of poor quality and exceeding costs will have to be dealt with by the contractor. Fortunately, since the contractor has to manage the design and construction processes, it is less likely that many design changes will be introduced (Blaťák 2016, p. 77). This will reduce the risk of delays or even the additional costs which may have been experienced after changes are introduced at the wrong time.

            Another benefit of this route features improved communication and reduced risk of conflict. This is due to the fact that the design and construction are combined. Hence, the contractor will be working independently where both sides of the project are working together towards the same goal (Ghadamsi & Braimah 2016, p. 17). Communication will be smooth since transparency will be achieved with ease. Hence, a lot of costs will also be saved when everyone is working together. The contractor has the opportunity of controlling the project so that any changes that are suggested do not interfere greatly with the progress.

Conclusion

            Considering the analysis conducted of the two case studies, it is clear that strategic project management is require to ensure that a project is completed successfully. It is important to consider the right procurement route for projects. Complex and high risk projects require approaches where the risk is not fully carried by the client. In addition, it should be able to promote proper communication across the hierarchy. Lastly, there is a need to ensure that the project can be monitored effectively to ensure that any problems are handled promptly before so much time and resources are wasted.