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  • QUESTION

     1st AD OE in ATROPIA-OPORD Phase III tasks Annex B, and Annex C3a    

    Need to create a power point presentation using Elements of Operational Design broken down into these areas: Decisive Points, Lines of Operation/Lines of Effort, Direct and indirect approach, Anticipation.

    Please used the attached information to build this power point again using Operational Design defining each of these areas

     

     UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY HQ, 1st Armored Division TBLISI, REPUBLIC OF GORGAS 14 September 2015 ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)

     

     B-1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

     

     (U) References:

    a.(U) Maps

    b.ADRP 2-0 “Intelligence,” August 2012

    c.FM 6-0 “Commander and Staff Organization and Operations,” May 2014

    d.Decisive Action Training Environment 2.1

     

    (U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan/Order: ZULU

    1.(U) Situation. Refer to base OPORD.

    a.(U) Area of Interest. Refer to base OPORD

    b.(U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

    (1). (U) Terrain. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate). (2). (U) Weather. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)(Not provided, use local light and weather data).

    c.(U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Appendix 1 (Intel Estimate).

    d.(U) Friendly Forces.

    (1). (U) Without assistance Atropia’s military and border forces will have a minimal level of success in defeating a Donovian (DON) invasion.

    (2). (U) Coalition. Refer to base OPORD and Annex C (Operations) for current US/coalition force situation.

    e.(U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Refer to Annex K (CivilAffairs Operations).

    f.(U) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations).

    g.(U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization)

    2.(U) Mission. The 1st AD Intelligence War-fighting Function provides timely, accurate and predictiveintelligence to support the commander’s objectives and to meet the information needs of subordinateunits planning and execution of Decisive Action operations.

    3.(U) Execution.

    a.(U) Scheme of Intelligence Support. Refer to Annex L (Information Collection).

    b.(U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Refer to Appendix 2 (Information Collection Tasking Matrix) toAnnex L (Information Collection).

    c.(U) Counterintelligence. Refer to Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence).

    d.(U) Coordinating Instructions.

    (1). (U) Requirements.

    (a). (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

    1.(U) PIR 1. Will OSC-S send the 81st Division Tactical Group (DTG) along Avenue ofApproach (AA) 5?

    2.(U) PIR 2. Will OSC-S send the 81st DTG along AA1?

    3.(U) PIR 3. Will OSC-S send the 98th DTG along AA5?

    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)

    B-2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

     

     

    4.(U) PIR 4. Will the OSC-S commit forces to Erdabil Province?

    5.(U) PIR 5. Have Donovian forces penetrated any BCT’s defenses?

    6.(U) PIR 6. Has OSC-S committed the exploitation force (81st or 98th Armored DTG)south of the International Border?

    (b). (U) Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIR). Refer to base OPORD.

    (c). (U) Requests for Information (RFI). RFIs can be sent digitally via SIPR to 1st AD G2 or via LNO.

    (2). (U) Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel.

    (a). (U) Prisoners of War, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons. The detaining element(s) will notify 1st AD via FM immediately to report the name of the detainee and the reason for detention IAW the reporting format in Appendix 13 (Internment and Resettlement Operations) to Annex C (Operations). Report incident where excessive force was used against civilians, women, children, mobs and rioters. Use only the minimum force and gradually increase force as necessary when detaining a civilian. Refer to Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations). If individuals are found with evidence and equipment such as weapons, capturing unit personnel detain the individuals in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Capturing units tag the detainees and the equipment using a Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag). Capturing units account for the evidence on Department of the Army (DA) Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document). Capturing unit maintains and transports evidence with the detainee to maintain its association with the detainee to include photographs showing the evidence and the detainee in the same picture.

    (b). (U) Captured Documents. Report immediately to 1st AD G2 any captured and/or exploited documents indicating attack against U.S. Forces, Atropian military forces or infrastructure, or any exploited documents that can further answer 1st AD PIR or support Decisive Action operations. Summaries of any documents found should be included in the daily GRINTSUM. Examples of captured documents are address books, daily planners, maps, receipts, notebooks, loose scraps of papers, etc. Account for the documents at the time the document comes into U.S. Forces possession. Original documents must not be marked, altered or defaced in any way and may contain biometric data. Capturing unit at each echelon should wear gloves to preserve potential evidence. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), Part C, to each document, as well as DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag). In addition to the Capture Tag, use the DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) for accountability of material during transportation. Documents captured in association with detainees and EPWs, with the exception of identity documents, are removed from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not destroyed. The documents need to be forwarded to 1st AD G2 DOMEX Team for further exploitation, archival and production of the appropriate document exploitation report to be disseminated back to the capturing unit via the Intelligence Staff section on the 1st AD Web Portal or the Theater Exploitation Database (TED), which can be accessed via the TED link on the 1st AD Web Portal.

    (c). (U) Captured Material. Report immediately to 1st AD G2 any captured materials, electronic storage media, or military equipment that can assist in further supporting Decisive Action operations or that may contain any threat or indication of attack against U.S. Forces, Atropian military forces or infrastructure. Summaries of any materials, storage media or equipment found should be included in the daily GRINTSUM. Examples of electronic storage media are thumb drives, computers, compact disks; Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards, high power cordless phones, etc. Account for the equipment at the time the equipment comes into U.S. Forces possession. All equipment must not be marked, altered or defaced in any way and no attempt to exploit the electronic storage media or cellular phone should be made unless by a qualified Multi-function Team. All equipment may contain biometric data. Capturing unit at each echelon should wear

    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)

    B-3 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

     

     

    gloves to preserve potential evidence. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), Part C, to each piece of equipment, as well as DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag). Communication equipment should not be altered in order to obtain a serial number. In addition to the Capture Tag, use the DA Form 4137 (Evidence/ Property Custody Document) for accountability of materiel during transportation. Media captured in association with detainees and EPWs are removed from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not destroyed. The electronic storage media will be forwarded to 1st AD G2 DOMEX Team for exploitation and production of the appropriate electronic media or cellular phone exploitation report to be disseminated back to the capturing unit via the Intelligence Staff section on the 1st AD Web Portal or the TED, which can be accessed via the TED link on the 1st AD Web Portal.

    (d). (U) Documents or Equipment Required. The 1st AD G2 will validate all map requests. Brigade S2s will consolidated all map and topographic requirements and forward them on a Standard Form 344 to the 1st AD G2 for approval. Any other requests for products refer to 1st AD TACSOP.

    (3). (U) Distribution of Intelligence Products. Subordinate units may use their existing standardized products for intelligence sharing to 1st AD G2.

    (a). (U) Graphic Intelligence Summary (GRINTSUM). Daily Division GRINTSUM (period covered: 0001-2400) are disseminated NLT 1200 local time via the 1st AD G2 webpage. Subordinate units will provide their daily GRINTSUM (period covered: 0001-2400) to 1st AD G2 NLT 0600 local time each day digitally. Minimum requirements for GRINTSUM must include a summary of all significant activity within their AOI, a current near-term assessment of the AOI, and a rollup of all reporting across every intelligence discipline (SIGINT, HUMINT, and any interrogation summaries) originating within the AOR during the last 24 hrs.

    (b). (U) Weather Outlooks, Advisories, and Warnings. Weather Outlooks are issued to subordinate units NLT 0900 local time daily via 1st AD G2 webpage. Any Weather Advisories/ Warnings will be issued via FM or VIOP, as the preferred method, but any form of dissemination can be utilized, as necessary.

    4.(U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).

    5.(U) Command and Signal.

    a.(U) Command.

    (1). (U) Location of the Commander and Key Leaders.

    (a). (U) G2 located at Division Main

    (b). (U) Deputy G2 located at Division Main

    (c). (U) TAC Deputy G2 located at TAC

    (d). (U) G2X located at Division Main

    (2). (U) Succession of Command. Refer to the 1st AD TACSOP

    (3). (U) Liaison Requirements. 1st AD does not require separate intelligence liaison personnel from subordinate units. Intelligence liaison duties can be executed by unit LNOs.

    b.(U) Control.

    (1). (U) Command Posts.

    (2). (U) Intelligence Coordination Line. Subordinate units’ operational boundaries are considered ICLs for subordinate units.

    (3). (U) Special Security. Special Security Office (SSO) requirements are directed by the 1st AD G2, SSO.

    (4). (U) Reports. Refer to Annex R (Reports).

    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)

    B-4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

     

     

    c.(U) Signal. Refer to Annex H (Signal).

     

    ACKNOWLEDGE:

    NOLL

    MG

    OFFICIAL:

    SWANN

    G2

    APPENDICES:

    Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)

    Tab A (Terrain) Tab B (Light-Weather) – Not Provided (Use local light and weather data.).Tab C (Civil Considerations) – Not Provided Tab D (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products) – Not Provided Exhibit 1 (Enemy Order of Battle) Exhibit 2 (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay – MCOO) Exhibit 3 (Enemy Courses of Action)

    Appendix 2 (Information Collection Tasking Matrix) – Refer to Annex L (Information Collection) – AnL2

    Appendix 3 (Counter Intelligence)

    Appendix 4 (Signals Intelligence)

    Appendix 5 (Human Intelligence)

    Appendix 6 (Geospatial Intelligence)

Subject

Technology 

Pages 7 Style APA

Answer

  1. Weeks 3-4 Assignment

    Can the world we live in today get more interconnected? Could the global village become any smaller? Regardless of our answers to these questions, it is true that the security of individuals and their countries will be an essential part of it. As the interconnections on a global scale become a common feature, the necessity to identify and define critical infrastructure gets even more acute. This paper aims to look at cybersecurity and why it is essential that critical infrastructure is identified and protected.

    Argument and Thesis

    The protection of critical infrastructure through legislations and cybersecurity ultimately makes the citizens of a country safer.

    Clement Cyber Security and Global Interdependence

    Clement advances the idea that interdependence in cyberspace presents challenges in the realm of cyber security. The writer admits that the interconnections that exist between sectors make it virtually impossible to effectively protect the critical infrastructures that exist within this cyberspace.

    The paper reiterates that this interdependence is seen through the often touted concept of globalisation. As a phenomenon, globalisation creates more interaction and connections between nations. What this means is that with closer connections between nations, cyber enabled critical infrastructure dependencies go beyond boarders of nations and become global (Clemente, 2013). A cyber security issues that is felt in Tokyo can affect people from all over the world. The paper explains all these notions through the lens of “critical infrastructure”. Globalisation leads to a more globalised infrastructure which are approached differently by various countries.

    The identified interdependencies make it very difficult to define defensive parameters. The paper assesses the security implications that are evident at the intersection between cyberspace and critical infrastructure. It is asserted that many countries import the critical infrastructure needed by their own societies. Even while digital interconnections lead to much more efficiency, the level of dependability also climbs, necessitating the virtue of resilience (Clemente, 2013). Solutions to these problems include the need to adapt to allow for flexibility and be ready to restructure departments, prioritize the ares that need immediate protection, incentivize to control and manage stakeholder behaviour and invest in resilience by protecting valuable dependencies.

    Department of Defense Cyber Strategy

    This strategy recognizes from the outset the vital role that the new cyber era has on the creation of opportunities but also the challenges that it brings to the country, in this case the United States. The strategy sees cyberspace as a competitive area in which the players involved attempt to outdo each other and every player has to adapt in order to survive.

    This strategy has its core as the participation in, and prevention of crimes that are done through the internet. The goal is to identify, expose and disrupt cyber activities that threaten the country and the capability of the country to use this information for the purpose of making strategic decisions that address the cyberspace (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003). The strategy here is to not only develop domestic capacity to advance in terms of the advances in cyber space race but also ensure that the allies that align with the United States have expanded capacities for cyberspace operations.

    The strategic approach adopted has an overemphasis on what the role of cyberspace is in the conflicts that the United States engages in. It calls for an agile and lethal joint force that accelerates cyber capability development, promote innovation, and leverage automation and data analysis to improve effectiveness (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003). The strategy also calls for strengthening alliances and attract new partnership. It also aims to reform the department and cultivate talent.

    FEMA National Infrastructure Protection Plan

    This article assesses how the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR’s) are susceptible to external attacks especially in case of catastrophes. These resources that include economic, transportation and energy differ in what they do and how they look. Public and private infrastructures are essential to the nation and in fact have a series of regulations that guide their protection.

    This paper uses the case study of Mason County to illustrate what is meant by critical infrastructure within a country. It involved interviewing the residents and firefighters to find out what they considered their most important infrastructure within the county. It then offers solutions to what is felt can be done to improve and protect the infrastructure. The paper presents ways through which Mason County can establish CIKR identification and mapping program. This, it says, can be done by needs assessment and situational analysis, stakeholder analysis and the securing of funding.

    Common Themes

    One of the first common themes in these readings is the sensitivity and critical nature of cyber information. It is generally accepted throughout the readings that cyber space is the new critical frontier that is essential to a nation. The ideas from Clement and the department of Defence strategy identity the critical role that cyber space play in the development of a nation. They also admit that even though there are advantages to these platforms, they are also full of challenges that may threaten the security and well-being of the country.

    The next theme is the theme of interconnectedness in a globalized world. The papers seem to admit that the phenomenon of cyber space has made the world more interconnected than before. Even while these interconnections make it easier to transact business, network and communicate and with people from all over the world, it also comes with its challenges (Bellovin et al. 2011). The papers suggest various problems associated with such interconnectedness for instance cybercrime, hacking to steal information, using information from the cyber space to plan and execute terrorist attacks

    Finally, how to solve some of the problems that emerge from the influence of cyber space also comes out as a theme. The papers seem to suggest rather urgently that immediate interventions are needed to detect and stop some of the problems seen in the cyber space (Clemente, 2013). The country needs measures to protect itself from system hacks and targets from countries who would want to steal information for their selfish interests. No wonder then that vital CIKR’s have to be identified in a formal way and protected.

    Differences in Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Assessment

    While cybersecurity focuses on the security of the cyberspace and the virtual world, Critical Infrastructure Assessment aims to identify critical infrastructure with the aim of offering them protection (FEMA, 2013). For cybersecurity, cyberspace is a place that is in consistent need of getting secured because breaches are tried every minute. The dynamic nature of the security issues also demand that they are addressed with innovation and creativity. The infrastructure assessed using this strategy outlined ought to be protected from potential harm.

    Cybersecurity mainly deals with ways of responding to the attacks by cybercriminals (it is reactive) while Critical infrastructure assessment deals with disaster preparedness (it is proactive). Unlike the infrastructural assessment, the criminals in cybercrime are always in contact with what they want to breach. There is no physical distance between the crime and the item. This makes cyber space even more vulnerable than the physical infrastructure that can be physically assessed.

    FEMA’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy and Clemente Key Requirements

    Clemente provided some requirements in determining the critical infrastructure within that country. First, he talked about increasing complexity whereby he explained that most infrastructure now depend on cyberspace which has shown considerable complexity (Clemente, 2013). There are interconnections between CI and cyberspace that make the definition even more complex. Secondly, he talked of shared language. Shared language considers the terminological consistency and how shared understanding would enhance efficiency. This allows analysis of critical infrastructure to proceed from the largest to the smallest issues. Next, Clemente talked of prioritization which reinforces the fact that prioritizing key assets and resources is critical in CI.

    FEMA’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy specifies the steps necessary towards the protection of critical infrastructure. It details the steps involved in the identification and mapping program in order to provide the needed protection. It begins from a needs assessment and situational analysis where efforts already taken and product imitations are discussed and agreed on (FEMA, 2013). A stakeholder analysis is then done to determine who would help with the project. Funding is then secured for the project.

    Application of Knowledge Sharing Strategies and Information Fusion in the EOC

    In every country, there are usually strategies to determine critical infrastructure and ultimately protect them from those who may want to destroy such structures. These structures can be defined within the cyber spaces or in the physical world. This need to define critical structures is borne out of the desire to protect countries, the people and these critical infrastructures. Addressing these problems in totality would mean that a systematic method is developed and parameters for specification of what constitutes a critical infrastructure developed (Bellovin et al. 2011). While the federal government stresses on a more confrontational attitude in dealing with breaches in form of cybercrime, FEMA on the other hand provides a systematic way of critically assessing and protection of critical infrastructure that may be targeted by enemies of the state.

     

    Conclusion

    The proliferation of cybercrime over the internet makes a case for the determination of critical infrastructure within a country. Critical infrastructure is found in the context of a system of an increasingly interconnected world. The interconnection is hailed as a success from the manner in which it has brought people together. However, the challenges it has presented in the process are diverse. These challenges have to be identified and addressed accordingly. Future generations will need better strategies of defining and protecting critical infrastructure. It is the glue that holds future economic, social and technological environments together.

     

     

     

     

     

References

      • 1st AD OE in ATROPIA-OPORD Phase III tasks Annex B, and Annex C3a

       

Related Samples

  • QUESTION

    Week 4 Discusssion    

    This is a discussion question that I need answered. I need the second portion of the questioned answered thoroughly, both bullet points. I have highlighted it in yellow to show that it is what I need answered. I need this r returned to me completed without any grammatical or punctual errors. The company that I want this question written about is Nissan Motor Corporation.

     

    Choose ONE of the following discussion question options to respond to:

    Using Adverse Conditions to a Company’s Advantage

    • Chakravorti (2010) discusses four methods that corporate innovators use to turn adverse conditions to their advantage. Examine an organization of your choice and briefly discuss how the organization might use one of these methods.

    -OR-

    Assessing Risk and Reward

    • Using the company of your choice, identify an important and difficult decision that they faced. What were the most important risks and the most important rewards of the decision?
    • What data, analysis or perspective would you have used to help Sr. Management decide if the rewards outweighed the risks?

 

Subject Business Pages 4 Style APA

Answer

Assessing Risk and Reward

The Nissan Motor Company is one of the leading automobile makers in the world. The Japanese carmaker has primarily enjoyed a successful run, allowing it to enter various regional and international markets such as the United States. However, the changing business environment was not favorable to the company in 2019. Notably, the cooperation recorded losses amounting to 7.8%. The experience pushed the management into making tough decisions, requiring almost all of its North American workforce to go for unpaid leaves.

In late 2019, the company announced that the decline in sales necessitated a two-day unpaid leave for the North American workers. The stated days for the vacation were January 2 and 3rd    (Chicago Tribune, 2019).  Notably, this move was a crucial decision for the company because of its conflicting impacts. Whereas on the positive side, it could help the firm minimize expenses, it threatened to affect the public perception of the company regarding employee welfare.

The rewards for the decision involved cutting expenses by not paying the workers on leave, which eventually would translate into reduced expenses. Another reward was that the decision could allow the company to optimize performance by evaluating employee performances then developing new milestones. However, on the low side, the company risked affecting its public image and brand name, especially in the North American market. As per Chakravorti (2010), the way an organization treats its employees influences the firm’s public perception. Thus, Nissan risked eliciting a negative public perception. With a distorted public image, the company could fail to revive its declining sales.

I would have advised the management of Nissan to utilize the Predictive Analytic perspective in determining the right decision to take. Ideally, the approach tries to predict what might happen in the future if particular decisions or actions are undertaken at the moment (Traymbak & Aggarwal, 2019). Looking at the situation at Nissan, the company needed to develop a goal such as increasing sales. After that, they would have made decisions aimed at realizing the set goal. In this regard, the predicted outcome could give the management an overview of whether more risks existed or significant rewards could be realized.

.

References

 

  • Levite A & Junghue, (2019, January 24) Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace: Towards Collaboration or Confrontation. Retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/24/chinese-american-relations-in-cyberspace-toward-collaboration-or-confrontation-pub-78213

    Simola, J. (2020). Privacy issues and critical infrastructure protection. In Emerging Cyber Threats and Cognitive Vulnerabilities (pp. 197-226). Academic Press.

     

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