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QUESTION

Moral sentiment theory    

Morality of mink releases                                                                             Sara Davidson Philosophy 280

 

The moral status of animals remains a contested issue. Recently questions have risen with regard to specific actions taken by the Animal Liberation Front regarding the releasing of mink from fur farms. Since 2007 there have been dozens of these releases, in fur farms in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Montana, and Utah. Closer to home, 3,000 mink were releases from Oakwood Mink Farm in Boyers, PA., in 2009 and 300 mink released from Lion’s Farm in Van Wert, Ohio in 2013. These mink are being raised to be slaughtered to make fur hats, coats, and gloves, the markets for which are 95% overseas. Is there moral justification for these actions? In this paper the Davidson position will be that these actions are justified, and will be defended by appeals to the inherent worth of the lives of the animals, the requirement for a consideration of the necessary flourishing conditions by the activists, and that the trivial and cosmetic uses of fur does not justify the killing of animals to satisfy the market demands.

First Davidson argument (#1): inherent value

This paper is defending that it is morally justified to break the law in some contexts in order to set some animals free, so some groundwork must be put into place. Thus the first Davidson argument (#1) is that mink have inherent value. These mink can be said to be valuable in themselves. They are sentient creatures, capable of at least some higher-level social skills, affection, monogamy, and caring for young beyond the period of lactation. Thus each mink could be said to have what Regan calls inherent value (Taylor, p. 67). By this is meant that each of these animals must be ascribed an intrinsic worth, independent of any economic use or benefit to which it may be put. Any being that is sentient, and has higher-level social skills, deserves this status. They are subject-of-a-life, and although that subjectivity is admittedly less than human standing, it is sufficient to justify emergency releases from fur farming.

Formal expression of Davidson argument 1:

  1. If any animal can be said to have intrinsic value, then they ought not to be housed in factory-farming conditions for commercial purposes.
  2. Mink can be said to have intrinsic value.

iii. Therefore, mink ought not to be housed in factory-farming conditions for commercial purposes.

 

Second argument (#2): Necessary flourishing conditions

Secondly, it is part of the Davidson position that these animals must be released to conditions that allow for their fair shot at a thriving and flourishing life. On this position, it is not justified to conduct emergency releases for cows, goats, sheep, or many house dogs or cats. These animals, although they too have inherent value, if released, would not have the proper natural skills to be able to survive. Mink, however, can survive in the wild, even if raised in captivity. They are natural predators, foragers, and acclimate to weather conditions quickly. Their chances for flourishing are greater if released. They are being ‘mink’ to a greater degree than they ever would if raised in factory farms for inevitable slaughter.

This point imposes additional moral obligations on the releasers. It is not clear mass-releases of mink discriminate properly between those mink that could survive in the wild and those that could not. Thus this might impose the (awkward) situation of the releasers being prepared to care for the animals themselves prior to full release, or at least preventing the animals from immediate harm upon release.

Formal expression of Davidson argument 2

  1. If any animal that has intrinsic value could ‘flourish’ if freed from captivity, then we have moral justification for doing so.
  2. Mink have intrinsic value and could flourish if freed from captivity.

iii. Therefore, we have moral justification for doing so.

 

Third argument (#3): Triviality conditions

The third Davidson argument is that there is no morally superior reason for farming mink than for not farming mink. Mink are not used for necessary food or medicinal purposes. They are not widely used as scientific test subjects, as they are not docile enough for easy handling in lab settings. They are farmed primary for trivial luxury clothing purposes, for which synthetic substitutes can now be easily found. That people ought to be allowed to wear fur-lined mittens in Russia is not a morally superior reason for the suffering and death caused to the animals. Nor does the right for American fur farmers to profit outweigh the intrinsic right to life of these animals. Given that there is no market or economic justification for these actions, the acts of releasing the animals are acts of justified disobedience designed to wreck the profitability and marketability of such practices in the first place.

 

Formal expression of Davidson argument 3:

  1. If the factory-farming of mink were morally justified, then there would have to be a morally superior reason for factory-farming mink than for not farming mink.
  2. There is no morally superior reason for farming mink than for not farming mink.

iii. Therefore, the factory-farming of mink is not morally justified.

 

Initial objections to Davidson arguments

Critics might respond to the Davidson arguments in the following ways. The first standard objections to any appeals to an animal’s having intrinsic value is that an argument has to be given as to why an animal be granted this status. Such a status cannot be granted automatically, nor can the criteria be arbitrary. But if the criteria for intrinsic value is that a creature must show higher-level social skills, affection, monogamy, and care for its young, that is going to include many mammals beyond mink. It would seem to be an arbitrary standard. A second objection to Davidson #1 is that nature itself holds to no such value. Once the mink are released, ironically, their intrinsic value status is eliminated by the first red-tailed hawk they encounter. Thus their value actually diminishes in ratio to their distance from the fur farms they were released from. American fur farmers have a national organization with minimum care-standards including food, shelter, and veterinary care.

With regard to Davidson #2, while there is some naturalist evidence that the chances that mink could survive and flourish are better than most animals released from captivity, those chances are still not very good. In the Boyers farm release, 400 mink died from roadkill, disease and predation in the first few days. In the Van Wert release, the majority of animals died from the stress of being returned to the wild. It was also the case that most of the mink in that example were kits, still weeks away from weaning. Thus the moral obligations imposed on releasers are too great to realistically be met; and a better option would be simply for the ALF activists to buy the mink at market prices and raise them themselves.

The objections to Davidson #3 follow from standard market arguments and standing laws. Some fur markets, such as in Russia, cannot be assumed to be ‘conspicuous’ luxury purchases but very real human needs for affordable warmth in harsh winters. One must also weigh the good performed for the animals against the ‘harm’ caused to the livelihood of the fur farmers. Each lost mink animal was worth $100.00, so the loss of their product was considerable. The activist actions violated state and federal laws, and given that the mink-herds were commercial property, constituted theft. While the uses of the mink-fur may be considered trivial, the loss of revenue and property to farmers is not, and is legally recognized as a harm of its own.

Davidson responses to these objections

Regarding the objection to the arbitrariness of the criteria for intrinsic value, the Davidson paper has provided criteria, namely that the animals in question must show higher-level social skills that render the species subject of a life. Given the nature of intrinsic value, it is not necessary to assign specific criteria beyond those, since possession of those virtues would no longer be ascribing intrinsic value to the animals in question. It would be incumbent on the objector to provide a non-question begging argument as to what criteria would eliminate mink from being considered as being subject of a life. As the Taylor text shows, any efforts to draw such lines regarding the moral community will rule out some human beings (Taylor, p. 27).

The second objection is the strongest one to the Davidson conclusion, and requires a modification of the typical position of most advocates of mass animal releases. As the paper’s thesis acknowledges, mink rescues must be accompanied by a consideration of the conditions that allow for their fair shot at a thriving and flourishing life. Thus rescuers must not conduct these releases unless (a) it is more probable that the released mink will live fuller and more flourishing lives than they otherwise would have in captivity, and (b) the farming situation is such that those conditions are not being met. This might require fewer animals being released, or the animals being removed in cages and transported elsewhere or released at a later date rather than immediately set free. Thus the Davidson position is arguing more for an intervention-rescue operation more than a midnight prison-break.

The third objection speaks to the economic harm done to the property-owners and the violation of the governing laws in contexts of animal liberation. After thoughtful consideration, the Davidson position is that sometimes existing laws are immoral, and one must take an insurrectionist ethical stance, in the proud American tradition of Thoreau and Martin Luther King. If creatures are subject of a life and have inherent value, then ascribing them the status of ‘property’ was immoral in the first place. Thus the objection to mink releases on the basis of property is to be considered analogous to the arguments southern former slave-owners held in their lawsuits against the government after the civil war, demanding reparations for the ‘lost property and income’ from their slaves. A violation of a property right can only be considered morally justified if the property claim being violated was just in the first place. It is exactly this status that the Davidson paper questions with regard to the mink-farmers property claims in their animals. An extension of the Davidson position would be to engage in civil-disobedience with regard to fur-farms, or even to mink wearers, such as spray-painting their clothing, or engaging in acts to draw publicity to the conditions of these farms, so as to undermine the desire for mink, and hence the market-conditions that create the conditions of harm in the first place.

Further objection to Davidson: replaceability arguments

A further objection to the Davidson thesis is one that is also prominent in the Taylor text, what we will call the replaceability objection. This basically argues that the mink-releases are misguided, because such acts of trespass against the fur market actually destroy those conditions that allowed those mink to be brought into existence in the first place. Mink are not on any endangered species lists, because the environment has removed toxins known to be harmful to the species, but also because mink have value as commodities in the fur market. Thus fur farms allow for the greater numbers of mink to exist, and if fur farms met or exceeded the state standards for care, one could argue that a greater number of individual mink, and hence a greater total amount of mink-flourishing, is created by there being successful fur-farms, as opposed to that success being sabotaged. Thus if the animals are well-cared for, have free-range as animals, are provided their fair-innings, their populations are stable, and the animals are killed painlessly, then the mink are replaceable through the act of farming and hence their fur trade is morally justified (Taylor, p. 95).

Davidson response to the replaceability objection

The thesis of this paper has been defending the intrinsic value of animals. The replaceability objection, derived from Peter Singer, is rooted in preference utilitarianism (Taylor, p. 95). Thus it denies the intrinsic value of animals. Indeed, the standard response to utilitarian ethical justifications is that it denies the intrinsic value of anything. The Davidson position, on the contrary, is moderately deontological (Taylor, p. 22). It ascribes membership in the moral community to animals without qualifying criteria. It should also be mentioned that on Singer’s position, replaceability-status would equally apply as much to human infants as to mink, a position Singer seems comfortable with but most similar objectors would not (Taylor, p. 95).

Conclusion

The Davidson paper has defended the idea that acts of limited civil disobedience in the form of animal-releases of mink from fur farms are morally justified, provided there are conditions in place, namely that no further damage or harm comes to property or animals through such acts, and that the activists are obligated to consider and provide for flourishing conditions for the released animals. As these are acts of civil disobedience, such activists are to be prepared to accept whatever civil penalties result from such acts, in the name of greater recognition for their cause. It was objected that the Davidson thesis installed arbitrary conditions for animals being subject of a life, that animals would actually suffer more if released into the wild, and that the economic harm does to the property farmers outweighed the good created by the animal releases.  However, each of these objections could be countered, given the presupposition that animals have intrinsic value in their lives, and as such, if precautions are made to vouchsafe the animals transitioning back to the wild, that value has greater weight than the economic dis-value caused by the release. The final objection, that the sum total of mink-flourishing is actually increased by the existence of these farms, reduces the ethical issues to mere bulk considerations, and that these farming conditions are good is still a far off ideal. Sometimes doing the right thing requires drastic measures, but these measures have greater rational and ethical justification than the status quo.

11/2/20

  1. Hume and theories of moral sentiment
  2. Treatise: reason is a slave to the passions
  3. Ethics is based on emotion/sentiment
  4. Emotional intelligence; health
  5. 17th and 18th century as a response to egoism

iii. Scotish enlightenment; Hume and Adam Smith

  1. Sympathy- co-feeling the emotion (contagious)
  2. Empathy- the understanding of another’s emotion at-a-remove
  3. MSA-1
  4. If there is a general uniformity to human emotion, then there is an objective realm

of common sentiment upon which to ground ethics

  1. There is a general uniformity to human emotion.
  2. Therefore, there is an objective realm of common sentiment
  3. MSA-2
  4. If there is an objective character to our experience then there is an objective

character to our ethical emotionality

  1. There is an objective character to experience
  2. Therefore, there is an objective character to our ethical emotionality
  3. Ethics is based on emotions of sympathy
  4. Rejects any transcendent basis for ethics
  5. Nothing outside human configurations
  6. Deeper than any transcended

11/4/20

  1. Hume on Moral Sentiment
  2. Moral judgement: sentiments of approval from a general point of view
  3. A report of feelings with regard to other feelings
  4. If an ethical standard of general sentiment is achievable, then

ethical judgments are possible

  1. An ethical standard of G.S. is achievable
  2. Therefore, ethical judgments are possible
  3. Hume: the naturalist fallacy
  4. Two kinds of rational claims
  5. Relations of
  6. Matters of facts
  7. Values are neither relations of ideas nor matters of fact

11/6/20

  1. Hume objections:
  2. Standard obj. from previous thinkers or existing schools
  3. Deontological objections
  4. Replay criticisms of UT

iii. Aretaic traditions oppose Hume

  1. Objections to naturalism
  2. Hume invites the return of relativism/ cultural relativism
  3. tension between Humes emphasis on science and the naturalist fallacy
  4. Cannot derive ought from is
  5. Empathy might not be a ‘feeling’ at all
  6. Vehicle of conveyance
  7. Precondition of sentiment

iii. Connecting to others

  1. Associative inference
  2. Empathize without emotion
  3. Difficult to empathize with groups or absent proximity
  4. Sympathy as ‘contagion’ has no moral value
  5. Spectator theory is actually cognitive
  6. The separation is a rational inference
  7. Empathy is too susceptible to manipulation and dilution
  8. Similarity bias
  9. Outrage porn

 

 

 

Subject Philosophy Pages 12 Style APA

Answer

Moral Sentiment Theory

Moral sentimentalists believe that human sentiments and urges hold a critical part in advancing the framework of morality. Scholars understand that moral thoughts should be perceived as fundamentally sentimental, and these underlying moral facts are a significant reference to human sentimental reactions, and hence a core source of moral acquaintance and understanding (Allman and Woodward 166). Other theorists accept as true the possibility of all these underpinnings. The two outstanding attractions of the theory of sentimentalism are; creating sense of the practical concepts of morality, and locating a place where morality is described from a naturalistic worldview. However, the challenges that fall thereafter are the la,ck of capability to account for the deceptive normativity and objectivity of scruples (Tucker, 2013). Previous psychological theories have emphasized a lot more on the idea of emotional centrality in moral thinking, and these developments have prompted a renewed interest in sentimentalist ethics.

Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) inclines sharp divergent reactions among the interests of philosophers who pick up the idea. For instance, Kant considers this assertion as his favorite among the rest of his other Scottish moral sense theories. However, some have further dismissed its allegations suggesting that its theoretical aspirations are derivative and a devoid of systematic argument (Allman and Woodward 175). The disparate responses were triggered by a significant feature of the book of Hume, consisting broadly of what Smith personally considers “illustrations” of the occurrences of the moral sentiments. The author described the attempt elegantly in a bid to show why human beings fear death by nature, and the application of moral luck factors in individual analysis of diverse actions, and how they deceive human beings. He suggests;

But [resentment and gratitude], as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them. (TMS 81)

The underlying roots of modern sentimentalist ethical tradition dates back to British debates in the early 18th century. The Earl of Shaftesbury developed the idea of a moral sense in his Inquiry Concerning Virtueor Merit. In his understanding, Shaftesbury indicates that affection by reflection and the underlying motive triggering an action remain the significant object of moral evaluations, which transition to becoming the objects of a second-order affection (Björnsson and Finlay 29). He suggests that moral approval is the “sense of right or wrong”, can either be natural or inmate, and is often displaced by contradicting customs and habits to the action (Brady 138). Basing on Shaftesbury’s perception of the whole concept, natural and public affections are approved by the harmonious intentions driving the moral of the entire structure of rational creatures (Allman and Woodward 169). However, there is a space for subordinated and self-interested intentions because even the culture still agonizes whenever people lack self-preservation or defense. To be morally virtuous, Shaftesbury agrees with philosopher Smith that an individual is restricted to do exclusively the right things (Björnsson and Finlay 24). However, continually exercising the moral sense of the act for the same purpose remains worthwhile and honest.

Nonetheless, theorist Haidt’s counteracts this argument. Some critical features suggested in the early sentimentalist theories are highlighted in the contemporary model by psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2012). The starting point of Haidt’s argument is the advancing basic distinction in psychology in regard to two forms of cognitive procedures. The first system is made up of the intuitive system comprising of modular, automatic, often associative, effortless, parallel, fast, and affective processes (Way, 500). Human beings are mindful of their yields, as opposed to the courses that lead to a certain consequence, and these ideologies are parallel to the sense by Hutcheson. The second system comprises of the reasoning components of slow, effortful, rational, memory-taxing, conscious, inferential, and linear procedures (Allman and Woodward 180). As a recurrent subject in psychology, Haidt applies intuition as a terminology for describing opinions resulting from the Intuitive System. His experiential argument is that most ethical verdicts are a result of gut reactions, swift, and automatic affectual flashes.

Theorist Michael Slote presented a topical sentimentalist version on the strand of empathy/sympathy-based philosophies of moral justification, where he claimed that moral approval constitutes majorly the agent’s motives, which creates room for empathy (Björnsson and Finlay 20). Some individuals’ actions trigger or exhibit a certain level of empathy towards others, and this can be presented in the form of a warm feeling containing a moral approval (Allman and Woodward 171). In contrast, people who are less empathetic often manifest cold actions towards their peers or colleagues. Since moral judgments are established on moral approval and disapproval, Stole strongly feels that empathy could help to comprehend an individual’s underlying intuitions and judgments.

If agents’ actions reflect empathic concern for (the well-being or wishes of) others, empathic beings will feel warmly or tenderly toward them, and such warmth and tenderness empathically reflect the empathic warmth or tenderness of the agents. … [S]uch empathy with empathy … also constitutes moral approval, and possibly admiration as well, for agents and/or their actions. (Slote 2010: 34–35)

More precisely, Slote sentimentally suggests that:

Differences in (the strength of) our empathic reactions (or tendencies to react) to various situations correspond pretty well to differences in the (normative) moral evaluations we tend to make about those situations. (Slote 2010: 21).

Objection

Slote’s justification on morality was, however, objected in the sentimentalist camp. According to Jesse Prinz (2011), the perception of the idea is subject to disapproval difficulties. The matter is, failing to empathize, critically different from disapprobation, nor does it present equal and comparable motivational effect. Julia Driver (2011) further support Prinz by suggesting that individuals such as autists, who basing on some opinions are incapable of withstanding empathy, can disapprove or approve of things as being morally appropriate. Slote’s view further faces diverse challenges in terms of sufficiency and necessity, implying that people’s support of un-empathetic activities, such as partaking an action out of sense of duty, or engaging in the appropriate action with a wrong reason (Allman and Woodward 166). Similarly, some empathetic activities have been disapproved naturally by people, for example, helping a person at the expense of several others who are less close to the agent.

To some extent, Frances Hutcheson fills in Shaftesbury’s draught following his well-thought disagreement for the reality and effect of a moral sense that magnets the theorist’s refusal of intuitionism and rationalism. Since most individuals fail to approve their doing due to self-evidence or self-interest, a different concept must be applied to explain human convictions further. In his understanding, Hutcheson believes that sense refers to a “determination of the mind, to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us, independent on our will” (1725: 90). According to Bagnoli (2012), the notion implies that above all, moral sense approves the overall calming desire in other people’s happiness in discrepancy as of specific compassionate thirsts including love and the underlying empathy. In this perspective, in direct distinction to the view given by Shaftesbury, the primary intention of actions that are ethically commendable is munificence and not the imagination that a certain deed is mandatory or it can alternatively support an individual’s moral logic. From Hutcheson’s understanding of this vocabulary, morality remains the primary foundation of some vindicating motives that are not so exhilarating though (Björnsson and Finlay 12). Considering that such sense is acknowledged on a traditional basis and develop impulsively, Hutcheson summarizes that a moral sense is,

a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of Actions, when they occur to observation, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them. (1725: 100).

Objection

However, psychologist Haidt argues in contrast to the likelihood of reason causing moral verdicts. He further claims that most individuals do not always participate in reasoning from the word go (Björnsson and Finlay 24). Even if this is a real possibility, it does not guarantee that people’s judgments are primarily reasoning, or perhaps another individual’s reasoning especially in the context of customarily molded dispositions, as some people are unresponsive to reasoning. Daniel Jacobson (2012) further supports this ideology, indicating that most individuals lack reasons behind their judgments, and in most cases, they present thin explanations. In the dumbfounding studies suggested by Haidt, an act can be unnatural but this does not discount it as giving a reason for someone’s judgment. Jacobson further notes that there are harm-based underpinnings to consider the harmless incest factor suggested by Haidt as wrong. Although very few, or actually no problems, might arise when siblings indulge in sexual intercourse, they take detrimental risks of emotional repercussions (Björnsson and Finlay 20). While very few people may end up articulating the reasons behind sudden change in vibe, that does not imply that they do not exist as opposed to mere rationalization, societies have applied post hoc reasoning in articulating or comprehending the considerations of a person’s intuitive judgments that they are responsive to. His approach is applicable to the epistemic status of judgment on emotional basis.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References

Allman, J. and J. Woodward, 2008, “What Are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective,” Philosophical Issues, 18: 164–185.

Bagnoli, C. (ed.), 2011, Morality and the Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, G. and Finlay, S., 2010, “Metaethical Contextualism Defended,” Ethics, 121(1): 7–36.

Brady, M.S., 2011, “Emotions, Perceptions and Reasons,” in Bagnoli (ed.) 2011: 135–149.

Tucker, C., (ed.), 2013, Seemings and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Way, J., 2012, “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason,” Ethics, 22(3): 489–515.

 

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