Answer

Managing Army Change

Question One

            According to the four imperatives listed by the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the most important is to “develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21^st century”. This is because leadership is the pillar of an effective organization. The army is a crucial organization which requires leaders who can make effective decisions even with imperfect information. These leaders need to be always alert and prepared for anything as the army performs in a highly complex and dangerous environment[1]. The leaders are also expected to have the capability of training soldiers and leading them effectively towards any uncertain future. To enhance capabilities in this domain, the army should start accounting for the changing U.S demographics. There are some factors that may influence the best and brightest candidates to avoid joining the Army service. These include technological proficiency advancements, increased rates of obesity, and economic challenges among many others¹. The objectives of recruitment should be focused on capturing the diverse cultural attributes of the constantly evolving population, and also creating policies and programs that will incorporate long term demographic trends within its system.

Question 2

            The primary role of the concepts is to ensure that the specific capabilities required by warfighters to effectively and efficiently execute missions are identified in line with their associated operational performance criteria[2]. This happens through the use of the open process that provides the JROC with the needed information to enable them to make effective decisions on the required capabilities. Second, the concepts also support the development of capabilities by identifying available gaps within the present capabilities, and potential materiel and non-materiel solutions². It does this by providing affordability advice that is supported by the Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA). For instance, in the Doctrine domain of the DOTMLPF, the concepts influence development of capabilities in terms of Army Force modernization and science and technological developments by identifying a gap in the area.

Question 3

            After reading the speech by General Raymond Odierno at the AUSA Winter Symposium, I think there is an Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) principle that is not followed. It includes principle number one. The first principles states, “To provide essential focus on departmental policy and priorities for Army functional activities during all phases of PPBE”.From the speech at the AUSA Winter Symposium, the General’s focus was on the entire army which is inclusive of Active, National Guard and Army Reserve. According to the General, the end of FY17 would see to it that the Army reduces its end strength from 570,000 to 490,000 in the Active Army; from 358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard; and lastly from 206,000 to 205,000 in the Army Reserve[3]. The Army Reserve has already attained the number. Unfortunately it is not just about the numbers but also about reducing the end strength over a deliberate and gradual ramp.

Question 4

            The primary components of an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) include; the executive summary, program overview, cost and schedule, Key Performance Parameters (KPP), Key System Attributes (KSA), Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), technical baseline and configuration baseline[4]. A program’s progress is assessed based on the DoD Instruction 5000.2, which requires the program manager to incorporate test and evaluation in the development process. This is guided and executed by the test and evaluation working-level integrated product team. Test and Evaluation is the primary tool that can be used to measure progress of the program. This is because it quantifies results to be obtained in the end. This may be expressed in terms of probabilities that the program will work as expected. Therefore, a program’s progress will be compared to these probabilities to determine whether it is progressing as required or not.

Question 5

            The prioritizations outlined in the 2013 Manning Guidance agree with the imperatives of the 2013 ASPG. There are many reasons why I think they agree. First, the initial imperative is focused on the provision of modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities so as to ensure requirements are met across the wide range of military operations³. This imperative covers most of the first four priorities including; handling counterterrorism and irregular warfare, deter and defeat aggression, counter weapons of mass destruction and defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities. The second imperative of adapting leaders to meet the challenges of the 21^st century meets more priorities from the list. Leaders are very important in ensuring that these priorities are followed effectively. This is because they guide the Army members through decision making, and this will enable the meeting of the priorities through imperatives. The third imperative of adapting the army to provide more land power agrees with the priorities in that it covers areas such as operate effectively in space and cyber space, conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations, and also project Power despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges . Enhancing the all-volunteer army imperative agrees with the priorities in that the last statement is to conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and other operations.

Question 6

            The end of continuous operations, proposed budget cuts, and planned reduction in Army end-strength will impact the Force Generation model through many ways[5]. First, the model may not be as effective as before as it will no longer invest in next generation combat systems, but instead rely on weapon upgrades. Second, the army is dismissing most of its active-duty warfighters, thus reducing the number of members in the sector. This is what leads to the next statement; dismissing active-duty warfighters is affecting the morale of the remaining members, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the army as a whole. Most employees will not want to go willingly, but they will view the action as being forcefully laid off for no reason. Lastly, the lower the number warfighters, the more difficult it will be to accomplish all the set missions. Therefore, the army will have to decide on which missions to forego.

Question 7

            The first difference of using contractors instead of military service members is that the previous are not effectively trained[6]. To overcome this difference, the commander needs to ensure that contractors are effectively trained alongside the professional military education. Second, working with contractors creates room for fraud, waste, and abuse of the people. The commander can combat this difference by ensuring that funds for the operation are assigned to specific general officers. This will improve accountability. Lastly, contracting is not valued within the culture of the military. The culture of the military should be changes in such a way that it can easily accommodate the idea of contracting.

[1]Rosen, Stanley G. “Strategic Planning and Management in Defense Systems Acquisition.”(Defense Acquisition Research Journal: A Publication Of The Defense Acquisition University 20, no. 3, October 2013): 261-282.

[2]Dunaway, David. “Creating Integrated Warfighting Capabilities.” (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 8, August 2013): 60-65.

[3]Odierno, Raymond T. “America’s Army The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action.” (Army Magazine 62, no. 4, April 2012): 27-32.

[4]Broadus, Will, et al. “Obtaining the Right Solution for a Capability Gap.” (Defense AT&L 37, no. 6, November 2008): 39-43.

[5]Odierno, Raymond T. “America’s Army The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action.” (Army Magazine 62, no. 4, April 2012): 27-32.

[6]Broadus, Will, et al. “Obtaining the Right Solution for a Capability Gap.” (Defense AT&L 37, no. 6, November 2008): 39-43.