QUESTION
Case study
case study is to be no more than 1500 words excluding references and citations
The company (LSM) seems to be a forerunner in getting the contract for managing the DP vessels in Brazil. The ship owner in Brazil however needs to be fully convinced of the available technical talent of Logical Ship Management (LSM) in this sector. LSM top management decides to send you, a superintendent working in their office in Houston who has also worked in the offshore vessel sector previously and has some years of DP experience, to go and help in conducting the FMEA of one of their vessels in a shipyard in Europe along with the owner’s representative, DP supplier and the classification society.
Write a report in detail to the senior management about the FMEA simulation and trials, how it was conducted on the Diving Support Vessel (DP2) and your special contribution in this, which according to you may work out to be the deal clincher in getting the company the vessels to manage.
this is the question I have,
Case Study Report Format
The case study report format focuses on the language, style, layout and overall comprehensiveness of the report. A standard written report format includes:
• Title Page
• Table of Contents
• Executive Summary
• Body of the Report
• Conclusion
• References, Exhibits and Appendices
• Written Communication, Language and Style
this is my criteria
PLEASE NOTE: THIS CASE STUDY WILL BE MARKED USING THE STANDARD DIPLOMA GRADE MARKING RUBRIC DETAILED IN THE ACADEMIC COURSE HANDBOOK. HAVE A LOOK AT THE RUBRIC AND THE CRITERIA PLUS DESCRIPTORS TO UNDERSTAND THE MARKING CRITERIA. THIS WILL HELP YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT IS EXPECTED OF YOUR SUBMISSION AS THE MARKER WILL USE THIS RUBRIC TO DETERMINE YOUR GRADE.
Case Study Report Format
The case study report format focuses on the language, style, layout and overall comprehensiveness of the report. A standard written report format includes:
• Title Page
• Table of Contents
• Executive Summary
• Body of the Report
• Conclusion
• References, Exhibits and Appendices
• Written Communication, Language and Style
Case Study Report Content
Your report content, besides the technical part, will also be graded on:
• Operation Perspective
• Judgement and Integration
Critical to a well-written report is that it meets the requirement of both format and content. When writing a report, connecting threads between thoughts must be present.
For example, issues, analysis, recommendations and implementation must flow from each other. Ideally, all recommendation(s) will fall in line with the identified strategy.
The main recommendation(s) should be aimed at fixing the system, not just the symptoms.
The following section outlines the written and content requirements for a case report.
The written case report should follow these guidelines:
Audience: You will normally be writing your report to a specific person. Assume this person is already familiar with the facts of the case. Do not simply repeat the facts. Rather, use them as required, to support.
Style: Your report must be typed double spaced. It must have at least 2.5 cm margins on all edges; and, it must have a white background, complete with page numbers. Write in complete sentences. Do not use point form, except when providing a coherent list in a wider context. Resist the temptation to use too many new "tools" (e.g. clip art, colour). Black-on-white is all that is required.
Information Classification: General
Font: The acceptable font is 12-point for the report and 10-point for exhibits.
Your report should contain:
Title Page: This is a separate page that contains the name of the case
And the date you submitted the report.
Table of Contents: This page lists the heading and page number of each section and helps the reader to navigate through the sections of the report.
Executive Summary: This is a one-page statement of the problem, the purpose of the communication and a summary of the results, conclusions, and recommendations. For a report to be considered complete it must contain an executive summary.
Body of the Report: This portion of the report analyses the data and answers the questions: “Why is there a problem?” and “What should be done to solve the problem?” It contains both the analysis and solution.
Conclusion: It emphasizes the message of the report.
Exhibits: Exhibits may be used for such things as drawing, process flow diagrams or showing detailed calculations. Remember that the report should stand alone; the exhibits provide supporting information only.
Format
Written Communication: Format, Language and Style: A report should contain titles, sentences and point form lists (if required). It should demonstrate a professional tone and as far as possible, be free of spelling and grammatical errors.
While format supports the flow of the report, the content forms the core of the report.
The content allows the writer to demonstrate their understanding of the issues and provide an in-depth analysis, recommendation, implementation and follow-up plan.
Overall Content
Operational Perspective: Your report should demonstrate your ability to synthesize the information, to make assumptions on the problem described in the case and to prove your understanding of the environment. The perspective is not a section on its own; it is demonstrated throughout the report and easily identified within the executive summary and detailed analysis, recommendation and implementation plan.
Judgement and Integration: Pay close attention to the logic, structure and clarity of the analysis. Is there a connecting thread or a sequence in the analysis or is it a mix of ideas? Is your judgement sound and based on facts? How well have knowledge and concepts learned throughout the course been integrated?
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| Subject | Case Study | Pages | 5 | Style | APA |
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Answer
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Report
Table of Contents
Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………….3
- Introduction 3
1.1. Instruction……………………………………………………………………………….’3
1.2. Scope of Work……………………………………………………………………………3
1.4. Order of Trials……………………………………………………………………………4
1.5. Necessities During Testing…………………………………………………………….4
2.0. Vessel Particulars 4
2.1. General…………………………………………………………………………………5
3.0. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….5
3.1. Trials Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….5
3.2. Documentation…………………………………………………………………………5
4.0. Findings………………………………………………………………………………7
References…………………………………………………………………………………….10
Executive Summary
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is needed by DP class two and three vessels because it guarantees no single error that can affect the vessel position's loss. An FMEA is an easy to utilize yet powerful hands-on engineering quality tool that helps identify and eliminate weak links in the early design stage of products and processes. A shipowner in Brazil requestedlogical Ship Management (LSM) to conduct FMEA of one of their vessels in a shipyard in Europe and the owner's representative, DP supplier, and the classification society. The trials extensively approve the findings of the vessel's FMEA and previous trials. On the trial results basis, the ship is perceived fit to perform operations comparable to IMO DP equipment class two within its demarcated functional limits when the DP system is constituted as tested amid trials. This paper discusses LSM's FMEA trial and simulation on a DP vessel in Brazil.
- Introduction
- Instruction
A shipowner in Brazil requested logical Ship Management (LSM) to conduct Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of one of their vessels in a shipyard in Europe and the owner's representative, DP supplier, and the classification society.
- Scope of Work
The trial program has been created from the FMEA of the vessel’s DP structure and the Dip-linked equipment. The trials are meant to demonstrate that the ship meets the IMCA M 103 requirements, directives for dynamically placed vessels' design and function, the IMO directives for vessels with vibrant positioning framework 1994 (MSC 645), and Lloyd's Register Procedures and Directives for ships classifications. IMO MSC/Circ. Six hundred forty-five indicate that the survey should guarantee that the DP system is under maintenance as per the directive's applicable parts and is in excellent working order. Likewise, the test of all crucial systems and elements must be done to document the DP vessel's ability to keep its position after failures linked with the allocated equipment class.
- Essential Workforce in Attendance at the Trials
- Vessel Superintendent
- Classification Society Surveyor
- Vender Representative
- Chief Engineer
- Witness
- Order of Trials
Surveyor representing LSM witnesses the 2020 trials and observed significant outcomes, alarms, and printouts of different tests and disconnections as needed. The trials started at roughly 10 am on 21st March and were concluded at 4 pm on 24th March. When doing the trials program, we experienced monsoon conditions with wind velocities of up to forty knots and waves of roughly six meters. The vessel kept its position though it indicated that choosing the accurate heading setpoint is very crucial.
- Necessities During Testing
The client will select a trials coordinator to plan the required resources and structure the trials program conduct. This person is from LSM and is the vessel superintendent. Amid the trials, all proper shipboard equipment is needed to become fully functional. Mostly all propulsion units and their controls, both manual and automatic, all power production equipment, PC system, and all position orientation framework must be entirely operational, comprising their alarms, trips, and so forth. All trials must be done with the master's approval and with full consideration to safe vessel navigation.
- Vessel Particulars
- General
The vessel (ARAMIS) is registered in Brazil and classified by Llyod’s classification society.
- Conclusion
- Trials Conclusion
An entire set of tests were done on the vessel as per the vessel’s trials checklist. The trials primarily indicated the vessel’s conformity with present DP directives and policies. On the vessel trial outcomes, the ship is regarded fit to perform operations comparable to IMO DP equipment class two in its described limits when the DP framework is configured as tested amid trials and observed.
- Documentation
There is a classical seawater framework with two autonomous plate coolers with the back-flushing framework and three seawater pumps operating parallel. Several functioning pumps rely on the cooling medium demand. Proven failure modes for the seawater framework arehighlighted in the table below. There are two probability levels, the low and the medium, ascertained by the FMEA inspector's determination (Rokseth et al., 2017). The extreme level is not documented. Also, there are only two criticality levels which are minor and major. There are not any challenging or significant challenges having a risky impact on DP functions. Suppose we integrate just constantly happening problems quickly to eradicate engine room (ER) or deck officers (DO) workforce but low risk for the DP function. In that case, we might overlook the riskiest ones, but they happen very seldom. For the DP function's security, the workforce reaction to the riskiest failures is the most significant.
Sea Water System Failure Modes
|
Failure Mode |
Causes |
Probability |
Local Impact |
Final Impact |
Criticality |
Remarks |
|
Sea Water Pressure |
Gridlocked solution filter |
Medium |
ECR low-pressure alarm. The standby pump begins. |
Decreased cooling |
Minor |
Prompt action by ER workforce will avert this challenge portraying itself more. |
|
Failure of the pipe-work |
Low |
ECR low-pressure alarm as the standby pump begins. |
|
Medium |
Notify DPO if an error cannot be corrected quickly. Engines will function on decreased load, and adequate reserved volume exists. |
|
|
LT Cooler |
Dirty plates |
Low |
LT temperature rises |
High LT temperature can affect the outcome in elevated engine temperatures and engine shutdown. |
Minor |
Every system is equipped with a back-flashing plan. Planned maintenance will decrease the possibility of this happening. |
- Findings
The vessel's DP system is a class two system where four generator sets, two electric motors, two tunnels, and two azimuth pushers on the keep propeller can be divided into two isolated systems. Thus, this configuration makes that functioning with a divided bus-bar is the safest alternative for the vessel. A divided bus-bar is the typical operational mode both a whole andhalf black-out test has been performed in the FMEA trials. The half black-out test was introduced by closing one engine room at the fire alarm, such that half the propulsion vigor is lost. The vessel's control system, which comprises the oil and gas generation control system, has the selection to alternate between various modes. Thus, these dissimilar modes, such as tanker mode, contain particular regulator settings for different vessel functional circumstances (Herdzik, 2012). after the engine room power was lost, the crew somehow transferred from production method to tanker mode on the vessel regulator system. But this transformation made that fire alarm in the engine-room uncancelled, as the vessel control framework had to remain in production mode to permit that (Tjallema et al., 2007).
Hence this prerequisite of the vessel regulation framework had to remain in a similar mode when a fire alarm is operational as the ship's operator was unaware. Since discovering the switch to the tanker, the model produced difficulties, regaining the misplaced engine room occupied an hour rather than the anticipated few minutes. Since the crew was unaware of the vessel control structure's rationale, which necessitates staying in a similar mode to reset the fire alarm, the wrong decision was made in switching to the tanker mode. The complex reasoning in the current vessel control framework makes it very challenging for a crew to know all specific decisions' impacts. Thus, this can cause dangerous circumstances as unanticipated events can occur when an alteration in the control framework setting is done. Amid the production of this condition would likely have triggered needless interruption from the field. As the vessel control framework is connected to the DP system, it is crucial that the crew handling this system comprehends these linked and their actions impact the DP system. Also, the vessel regulatory framework's rationale should be as precise as conceivable as the operator's activities' outcome should be entirely distinct (Mode, 2011).
A whole black-out test indicated that the system could regain very promptly. In divided bus-bar mode all generator was forced to trip making all power be lost. As anticipated, the UPS system functioned, and the generators habitually began again. in one minute, the initial thruster returned online, and the vessel glided less than five meters off position. But in the operational circumstances when black-out happens, a reason for the black-out happening must exist, which could be uncertain to the DP operator (FMEA, 2009). in such scenarios, the recovery takes longer as the black-out cause must be solved and discovered before restoring the power production and distribution. The test indicated that when an equipment piece fails, an enormous volume of alarms can be provided by the vessel regulator framework and the DP system (Skogdalen & Smogeli, 2011). such alarm flooding makes it very challenging for an operator to discover the root cause and competently handle it. If the alarm can more precisely demonstrate what triggered the trail of events, problem-solving would-be prompt and easier such that the DP system problem less damages position keeping.
References
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FMEA, D. (2009). Adams Challenge. Report No: GM-45214-0508-49138, Global Maritime, Aberdeen, London. Herdzik, I. (2012). Possibilities of improving safety and reliability of ship propulsion system during DP operations. Journal of KONES, 19, 219-226. Mode, F. (2011). Effect Analysis of the Dynamically Positioned Offshore Support Vessel "Aquanaut," report No: GM-22884-1103-14747, rev. 2. Global Maritime, Aberdeen. Rokseth, B., Utne, I. B., & Vinnem, J. E. (2017). A systems approach to risk analysis of maritime operations. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 231(1), 53-68. Skogdalen, J. E., & Smogeli, Ø. (2011). Looking Forward–Reliability of Safety-Critical Control Systems on Offshore Drilling Vessels. Deepwater Horizon Study Group. Tjallema, A., van der Nat, C., Grimmelius, H., & Stapersma, D. (2007, October). The road to eliminating operator-related dynamic positioning incidents. In Dynamic positioning conference (Vol. 2).
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