Developing Organizations and Leaders

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QUESTION

Developing Organizations and Leaders  

Assessing Writing

STUDENT NAME: Staun, Margaret

STAFF GROUP:106 Brooklyn

DATE:20210320

COURSE TITLE: ILE PH 2

ASSIGNMENT: L100 Take Home Essay

INSTRUCTOR: LTC Novak

TASS UNIT:

Requirement: Effective writing at CGSC is understood in a single rapid reading and is generally free of errors.      Standard: Writing demonstrates proficiency in— 1. Substance, 2. Style, 3. Organization and 4. Correctness.

Overall Assessment:

97+: A+

96.99-94: A

93.99-90: A-

89.99-87: B+

86.99-80: B

79.99-78: C+

77.99-70:C

<70: U

Total:

Instructor Comments

Cognitive Level Attained (Higher levels include characteristics of lower levels)

Elements of Thought

Universal Intellectual Standards

EVALUATION  (Judging or weighing by building and using criteria and standards)

-Clarity   -Accuracy   -Precision   -Relevance   -Depth   -Breadth   -Logic   -Significance   -Fairness

SYNTHESIS  (Integrating parts into a new whole)

ANALYSIS  (Breaking material down into component parts to determine structures and relationships)

APPLICATION  (Use of knowledge to solve problems)

COMPREHENSION   (Understanding of the material)

KNOWLEDGE  (Recall of specific information)

 

 

Instructions: This rubric integrates the Elements of Thought and Universal Intellectual Standards, IAW Paul and Elder, with the four standards of effective writing: Substance, Style, Organization, and Correctness. Substance is further divided into Content and Analysis/Problem-Solving/Conclusions. The underlined and bolded words directly correspond with Elements of Thought and Universal Intellectual Standards and demonstrate the relationship between effective writing and critical thinking. This rubric provides a means to explicitly assess critical thinking while assessing writing. Faculty should assign points based on the assignment’s requirements. Assess writing based on the descriptions in the Exceptional, Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory blocks.
Student Assessment					Faculty Assessment
Exceptional		Satisfactory		Unsatisfactory
Substance
Points	Content (30 points)							Points
30	Thesis is clear and concise. Content is fully compliant with the assigned requirement and the needs of the reader; everything is accurate; level of detail is suited to the needs of the assigned requirement and reader. Explanations and descriptions of content are clear and precise.  Quantitative information is relevant and accurate, expressed with appropriate examples, and well integrated into the text.		Thesis is not clear. Small omissions or inadequacies in content, but adequately covers the written requirement and needs of the reader. Some minor inaccuracies, but primarily accurate.  May occasionally include irrelevant details or omit important details. Explanations and descriptions are almost always clear and precise.  Quantitative information is accurate, and related to the text.			No thesis. Information (facts, assumptions, concepts/theories) are not accurate, and/or content is irrelevant, missing, or misrepresented, and/or insufficient detail, and/or inaccurate or ineffective management of quantitative information.
	Analysis/Problem-Solving/Conclusions (30 points)
30	Attains highest cognitive level that is appropriate to the assignment. Insightful, original analysis; conclusions superbly supported by evidence clearly explained; consideration of ethical/legal issues when relevant; consideration of alternative points of view or counter-evidence is fully addressed.		Attains an adequate cognitive level appropriate to the assignment. Thorough analysis, though perhaps not as insightful or original as it could be; conclusions adequately supported by evidence clearly explained; legal/ethical issues addressed but may be superficially treated; alternative points of view or counter-evidence, but may not be fully addressed.			Remains at a low cognitive level. Analysis superficial; little or no relation between conclusions and evidence; ethical/legal issues ignored; fails to address alternative points of view or counter evidence.
Points	Style (15 points)							Points
15	Words are precise; language is concise and without wordiness; writer’s tone is appropriate to the audience and purpose; sentences track clearly even to the rapid reader; transitions lead smoothly from one idea to the next. Active voice predominates. Sources, as relevant, are appropriately cited.		Some language is imprecise but generally understandable.  Style is adequate but lacks polish and directness.			The language is awkward, hard to read. The reader must backtrack to understand the writer’s meaning, or the reader cannot understand the meaning.  Language is extremely wordy; or primarily in passive voice, or inappropriate in tone. Citation of sources is missing or inaccurate.
Points	Organization (15 points)							Points
15	Points are clear and logically arranged so as to develop the content and analysis most productively for the audience.		Points are clear.  In general, points establish a logical line of reasoning.			Points are not clear or the sequence of points is illogical or inadequate to the needs of the task or audience.
Points	Correctness (10 points)							Points
10	Few if any departures from the published standard (grammar, punctuation and usage).		A few departures from the published standard (grammar, punctuation and usage), but not enough to confuse or distract the reader.			Departures from the published standard (grammar, punctuation and usage) significantly confuse or distract the reader.
Total Points

 

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

The Army School System (TASS)

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core

L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

 

Case Study Worksheet for L100

Developing Organizations and Leaders

 

Key Players From the case study.	Interests Includes needs, wants, desires, concerns, and fears of the key players.	Facts Verifiable truths that impact decision-making.	Assumptions The best guess about the current or future situation that is assumed to be true in the absence of facts.	Paradigms Generally accepted models or patterns that have had repeated validation (conventional wisdom).	End State  Those desired conditions that, if met, allow achievement of a sought-after future state.	Problem Obstacle to overcome in reaching the end state.	Vision A picture of the future framed by a value-based purpose that creates a path to drive behavior, change, and motivation.

 

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

The Army School System (TASS)

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core

L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

 

L100 Take Home Exam Case Study

AY 2020

“The 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team”

 

You are LTC (P) Shane. A month ago, you arrived on post to assume command of the 4^th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The current brigade commander, COL Joe Gould, is retiring for medical reasons. Your change of command is in 30 days. COL Gould was very gracious in facilitating your access to many aspects of the brigade to help prepare you for assuming command. Your initial meetings with COL Gould and CSM Thornberry, the brigade command sergeant major, gave you a very positive review of the ABCT. In the last 30 days, you had opportunities to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade.

 

The 4^th ABCT returned from Afghanistan and is in the midst of preparing for deployment as part of the European Reassurance Initiative, (ERI). The brigade deploys to Europe on a nine-month rotation intended to provide a more robust rotational US presence throughout Europe for defense and deterrence. The initial plan calls for one battalion to participate in Atlantic Resolve North in the Baltic Region, with another battalion moving to Romania and Bulgaria to participate in Atlantic Resolve South. The main portion of the brigade will spend most of its time in Poland occupying Polish barracks and sharing ranges with the Polish Army. Prior to deploying to Europe, 4^th ABCT will execute a decisive action rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) focusing on defeating a near peer hybrid threat.

 

During the Afghan deployment, the 4^th’s parent division headquarters and the other divisional BCTs did not deploy with the brigade. Instead, the 4^th ABCT worked for two other divisions and with a number of other BCTs during their deployment. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 4^th detached one of its combined arms battalions for nine months. This battalion, “The War Hawks,” gained a reputation for being star performers and they are very proud of the other division patch they wear on their right shoulder.

 

From your conversations with several individuals in the last thirty days, you learned that prior to the brigade’s deployment to Afghanistan 4^th ABCT had a great reputation. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high and it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The brigade had focus. Leaders and Soldiers were dedicated to the mission and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, but the prevailing attitude was that most problems could be resolved. More often than not, leaders solved problems at lower levels; they rarely reached the brigade command level. There was competition within the brigade, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Often the brigade and battalion officers met informally for social events. Although these were definitely social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely, with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. Other officers in the division often ridiculed brigade officers as “whackos” who always wanted to discuss work issues. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade non-commissioned officers.

Now it appears the environment is different. The battalions are competing, not to improve the brigade, but to set themselves apart from their sister units. Camaraderie amongst the battalion commanders and command sergeants major appears superficial.

 

Over the last month, you had the opportunity to review a number of historical documents, observe routine meetings, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade area.

Your review of the brigade’s historical unit status reports indicates the 4^th ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departure. The ABCT deployed at 92 percent strength, although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander’s comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well trained and qualified. The majority of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that surfaced within 60 to 90 days prior to the departure date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-combat-related medical problems. While the installation’s medical providers addressed many of the non-deployable Soldiers’ medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable Soldiers increased above pre-deployment numbers.

 

You noticed in the recent unit status reports (USR) that commanders highlighted a personnel readiness issue- a mismatch of open positions in the brigade and no one with the proper skill set to fill them; high turn-over of mid-grade personnel (significantly SSG and Majors), and shortage of Soldiers available for training. The commanders considered these issues training, not personnel shortfalls. While the brigade assigned strength ranges from 85 to 102% in the past reports, the shortfall is in enough healthy properly assigned Soldiers to fill out its tank, artillery, or other crews at each stage of training. While the shortage is reflected in the USR as low training readiness, it seems to be a question of personnel availability and readiness.

 

The brigade’s historical records from Afghanistan indicate the unit was successful in accomplishing all missions. Two battalions successfully performed security force advisor team (SFAT) missions, albeit with fewer support people than expected. The brigade commander reassigned personnel from the battalions not involved with SFAT requirements to other battalions of the 4^th. The documents suggest violence in the 4^th’s area of operations did not significantly increase, nor did it decrease, and casualties were light. Security of the populace and US forces was a major priority that they accomplished very well, but the records indicate the ABCT’s ability to support the host nation as mixed; the SFATs had marginal success influencing Afghan Army units and police forces. It appears the ABCT staff managed day-to-day operations effectively, but struggled to capitalize on opportunities and to anticipate and adapt to a changing situation.

 

Even though the casualties were few in numbers, one critical incident dramatically influenced the ABCT. Approximately three months into the brigade’s twelve-month deployment, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated on a patrol in one of the maneuver battalion’s area of operations. The attack killed the brigade commander, COL Timmons, the brigade command sergeant major, CSM Mullens, one of the battalion commanders, LTC Sandra Page, and wounded several other Soldiers and Afghan security forces. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the brigade deputy commanding officer (DCO), LTC (P) Allan assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Gould and CSM Thornberry.

 

Another document you reviewed is a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report compiled from observations of the 4^th in Afghanistan. From all accounts, the ABCT and its leaders performed well in Afghanistan given the circumstances. However, the official record indicates significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the organization’s future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.

 

Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of multiple combat outposts and forward operating bases (FOBs) created significant digital network challenges for the brigade’s network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed, making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade created operational friction. Subordinate units did not work together to overcome the issues.

 

Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to allow 24-hour operations over a sustained period. Often battle captains were taken “out of hide” to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs. While BN staffs were undermanned, the BDE Staff was adequately manned.

 

The Army’s decision to align two battalions with the SFAT mission just prior to the military readiness exercise (MRX) required the leaders to rethink combat organization. The ABCT never quite compensated for this additional mission even after COL Gould, who had SFAT experience, arrived to take command. Many key leaders and Soldiers in the ABCT, as well as the division staff, were aware of the strain between the SFAT mission and the combat role of the ABCT.

 

The stability operations mission created unique issues for the 4^th ABCT. Although the size of the ABCT staff had a positive effect on shaping operations within their area of operations, the additional tasks associated with resourcing and supporting the SFATs from members of the staff created a “dual-hatted” staff, reducing the staff’s effectiveness.

 

During the brigade’s deployment, the brigade commander tasked the deputy brigade commander to supervise the SFATs operating within the brigade’s area of operations; synchronize the operations of the brigade support battalion at a different forward operating base; be the “voice” of the ABCT to the media; act as liaison officer to coalition forces; and act as a chief of staff. These varied missions for the deputy created confusion within the brigade and this confusion created the perception of a weakened ABCT command structure. COL Gould contributed to this confusion when he left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the deputy brigade commander.

 

The Afghanistan environment placed severe demands upon available resources. Specifically, the need to protect the population and expand operations in previously unsecured areas increased the need for infantry squads. As a result, armor, engineer, artillery, and other Soldiers filled the void, performing civilian protection tasks and not their own military occupational skills. Soldiers from the forward support companies also augmented as vehicle drivers and alternate quick reaction forces within the maneuver battalions.      

 

The 4^th ABCT trained for the wrong mission-essential tasks during its training for deployment to Afghanistan. The brigade trained predominantly on combined arms maneuver tasks, with little emphasis on wide area security scenarios. Upon arrival in theater, operational necessity required use of seven versions of mine-resistant armor protected variant vehicles. The brigade was able to train on only one version at home station. The brigade created a driver’s training program to train drivers during the first two months in combat with the few assets they had available at the Bagram Airbase reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSOI). Lastly, during pre-deployment train-up, the artillery battalion focused on fire support tasks and not small unit operations.

 

The CALL report also indicated a potential problem existed within the culture of the organization. The desire to be an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of behaviors that were generally good-natured and helped instill an esprit de corps within the unit. The CALL reports contain information that implies some non-commissioned and junior officers allowed these esprit de corps building events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from esprit building to “sanctioned hazing” according to one junior non-commissioned officer.

 

The brigade is also working to overcome several equipment readiness challenges because of recurring shortages of class nine for several vehicles, as the brigade continues to train to meet objective T requirements. The division G-4 is working the issue as he mentioned at a division in-progress review (IPR) on the upcoming fleet modernization for 4^th ABCT’s M-1s and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The upgrade consists of an improved suspension for the Bradley, as well as new integrated mission command systems. The ABCT’s tanks will receive an upgrade to the M-2, the crew remotely operated weapon systems, (CROWS). After the meeting, you had a chance to discuss some of the challenges inherent in this upgrade with a few of the company commanders. It was a long conversation, and in addition to the logistic issues, some of the CPTs complained that many of the field grade officers often provided conflicting guidance from what they heard from the brigade staff. 

 

You have access to the after action reports from the most recently completed series of battalion live fire exercises, as well as a set of interviews from a defense contractor survey conducted during the battalion exercises. Division tasked 4^th ABCT to provide data to the contractor to support an AMC equipment and manning study. Training began in early fall with small unit gunnery for crew certification and progressed to larger units. As the weather grew colder, the scope of the exercises increased, with the goal to have 100 percent of the crews qualified for the brigade live fire exercise in February. The intent was for the brigade to use the spring to prepare for the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation.

 

Personnel turn over continues to hinder unit training requirements. There is a lack of synchronization between Human Resource Command’s (HRC) centrally managed personnel system and the local long-range training plan. While HRC committed to stabilize track commanders and gunners in all crews after gunnery, there are still issues with battalions losing qualified Soldiers. Leaders at all levels have to plan training without a clear understanding of losses throughout the year or the ability to influence losses. One company experienced an 80 percent personnel turnover between scout team qualifications and the end of company level qualifications. Another company commander reported that after qualifying his 14 Bradley crews, in the next ten days he lost five crews because of personnel losses. In addition to personnel turnover, you notice some details in the after action reviews that support the USR reports you reviewed. One of the brigade support companies was projecting a fill of only 69 of its authorized 140 Soldiers for the NTC rotation. A shortage of licensed truck drivers was also noted. One of the cavalry troops was short 15 people, 78 assigned to 93 authorized, and expected to lose 27 more Soldiers before NTC. The troop cannot crew two of its 14 Bradley crews and expects to lose two more after NTC. One of the armor battalions is short two platoon leaders and had no SFCs in platoon sergeant roles. Many of the current ABCT staff PCS in the next few months.

 

You also reviewed a Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program 360-degree commander and staff assessment of the 4^th ABCT from the Center for Army Leadership. Although Army has discontinued the multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) program, the summary of trends from the assessment indicates that the staff had the trust and confidence of the subordinate units. It also revealed the non-commissioned officers displayed confidence in their abilities and have good tactical and technical knowledge.

 

On the other hand, the assessment revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making and fell short of expectations on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. There is a perception by many officers of a lack of concern for leader development by the brigade leadership. The report indicated battalion commanders do not routinely counsel company commanders on their performance and the captains receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater. One company commander commented, “I have always been a top performer, I just do my best and hope it is good enough. If no one is yelling at me, I’m golden.” 

 

In the last ninety days, the ABCT headquarters (HQ) completed a command climate survey. There are some inconsistencies in the survey report. Many of the Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the ABCT, but report stress because of the unknown requirements of the ERI mission and the affect they anticipate it has on their families. There is clearly some disappointment amongst the leaders in the ABCT. One entry read, “COL Gould tells us in formations to take care of our families, but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My wife is really fed up with this unit.” Another comment reads, “Major Reins (brigade S4) goes out of his way to get certain females into his office. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. I think it is affecting the performance of the section, but what can I do, I am only a specialist.” Another comment read, “I am tired of getting chewed out about the smallest of issues. The leadership around here is on edge all the time. We never get anything done. We reinvent the wheel monthly to no purpose. Can’t wait to leave.” There were also several specific comments about a lack of time to complete assigned tasks and a frustration that despite working long hours nothing seemed to change. You can find no indication that the ABCT leadership took any action on the issues within the survey.

 

Last week while you were working out at the post gym, you had an opportunity to listen to a running conversation from a few company grade officers from two of the ABCT battalions. They were discussing the upcoming deployment to Europe. Two of them were enthusiastic and excited to get to Europe. “Look this should be fun. We spend nine months in Eastern Europe. We should have plenty of time to visit the sites.” “Plus it will be good to get away from the distractions here.” “Yea, we seem to wander in the wilderness in my battalion. At least this will give us a focus and a purpose.” We just go from one event to another.” Another officer chimed in maybe this will give us a focus. It seems to me we sure need it.”

 

While attending the division’s monthly, mandatory training session at the post theater, you also overheard an interesting conversation outside the theater while on break. You heard two senior NCOs discussing a case where a SGT from 4^th ABCT lodged a sexual harassment complaint using the aviation brigade’s EO NCO. The NCOs also discussed some other issues that you thought were too sensitive for “hallway chatter.” You stepped in to make a correction and then returned inside.

 

The brigade is losing people as they move to new assignments or leave the Army. The personnel outlook is mixed. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for three of the brigade’s battalions occur in the next 60 days. The last personnel report indicated that the brigade had 60 to 65 percent of the staff sergeants required. This shortage was based on routine PCSs and transfers of NCOs to organizations deploying prior to 4^th ABCT.

 

On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing the Command and General Staff Officer Course or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions’ strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. There is a significant turnover expected in the officers in the brigade headquarters and among company commanders. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment and expects Human Resource Command to fill the brigade at 80 percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade before assumption of the European Reassurance Initiative mission.

 

CPT Pat Donelson is the brigade S1. He just recently moved up to the brigade from “The War Hawks.” He is a recognized self-starter and well respected in the brigade. Yesterday he was discussing an inbound personnel printout with you and he had some specific concerns. One of the inbound lieutenants is a recent graduate of Ranger School and he wanted to know where to put her. She is a logistics officer. He also mentioned, “We don’t need this kind of attention or problem, and this is going to be a big one. We have to put her somewhere she can’t mess up.” After mentioning to you he was having trouble finding the equal opportunity (EO) NCO to address a question from the division EO office, CPT Donelson also gave you a heads up about a rash of officer actions from some of the battalions. He said he just dropped off seven packets in COL Gould’s inbox of officers requesting release from active duty. He also mentioned, based on discussions with the battalion adjutants at the last adjutant’s call, there would be more requests coming from the battalions.

 

The brigade S2 is Major Pete Stanford. Major Stanford appears to be very confident and competent, but he seems extremely anxious about his recommendations since returning from Afghanistan. He has some good systems in place, as well as a good team. He works very hard to be on top of everything. LTC (P) Allan mentioned his concerns to you during one of your previous conversations “Stanford is over compensating. He feels responsible for the deaths of the brigade commander, CSM, and the battalion commander. He briefed the threat along the route at one of brigade updates. He just needs to get over it and move on.” In the last command and staff, Stanford voiced his concerns about the increasing trends of serious incidence reports and blotter incidents. He said, “I’ve checked with the other brigades and our numbers are increasing and the other brigades are not.” “I am not sure what the issue is but I know it is not something we can openly discuss with the boss.”   

 

Major Jeff Reins is the brigade S4. The S4 section performed poorly during the last deployment. While Major Reins appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, he clearly does not know how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The battalion commanders note that the S4 section can meet critical supply efforts to support operations, but struggles with the myriad of garrison procedures and associated requirements. The S4 section has conflict with the division G4 that has led to an adversarial relationship. The Soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group.

 

Major Sean Springsteen, the brigade’s S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting you heard him discussing something with the deputy. He commented, “Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I am not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We’re not allowed to make routine decisions at our level and it seems we jump from one crisis to another with no apparent direction. I thought when we returned from Afghanistan the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to get reacquainted with my family. It has been far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise (CPX). A division CPX for crying out loud! We were told the division’s new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division’s 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Afghanistan. At least there everyone knows they have to work 24/7 and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don’t have the family wondering why daddy isn’t home. Even my wife, who basically ran the brigade’s family readiness group when we were deployed and is a very dedicated Army wife, is about to throw in the towel.”

 

The 4^th ABCT Chaplain is Chaplain (Major) Susan Tyndell. You remember her from a previous assignment where she served as a battalion chaplain in another division a few years ago. She came in this morning and mentioned she was on the brigade commander’s calendar and was bumped, again because “something important came up.” “This is the fifth time. I have had real trouble getting in to see him since we returned.” Her frustration and concerns were apparent. She went on to say, “You think we have problems, you don’t know the half of it, the things I am hearing and seeing should be his priority.” She continued voicing her concerns. “Without getting into too much detail I am actively counseling eight separate couples regarding infidelity or other marriage related issues. Many of these seem to involve issues from the last deployment. I never thought I would be this busy once we got home. It never seems to end.”     

 

Red cycle tasking are a frequent subject in many of the meetings you have attended, as well as conversations you have had with other leaders. The transition of one of your sister brigades from an SBCT to an ABCT, as well as the deployment of another brigade to Korea, aggravates the situation. A few days ago, you heard about an exchange at an ABCT command team meeting. The commander and sergeant major of one of the brigades combined arms battalions provided COL Gould and CSM Thornberry a detailed review on the impact “red cycle” taskings had on unit operations, to include individual training, personnel management, and equipment reset. The battalion commander stated, “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to spend quality time with their families after being away for nine months and getting ready for NTC and ERI, then pile on so many competing requirements, they have to work until 1800 hours each night. When you add on red-cycle tasks, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When I have to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it’s more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive and make-work.” 

 

The battalion command sergeant major added, “This is worse than I’ve ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division command sergeant major at his last senior NCO call, he dismissed me by saying, ‘we have had red cycles throughout my 26 years in the Army. They’ll always be here, so quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Afghanistan!”

 

The response of COL Gould to both of his subordinate leaders was telling. “Look I am not here to do your job for you! Figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or my sergeant major to fix your problems or whine to division about what you can or can’t do! Just get it done!”

 

You had the opportunity to meet the brigade S-3, Major Robert Castillo, when he dropped off some additional information you had previously asked for your “smart” book. During the short meeting, you asked him what was hot on his plate. He seemed a little frustrated and explained he was working a short suspense on a safety investigation. One of the battalions had three Soldiers severely injured last week. He went on to say the preliminary findings indicate that a company commander likely ordered an unlicensed Soldier to drive a Bradley. This seems to be a reaction to a shortage of crews in this particular company, but he said he was really tired of this sort of thing. Your previous interactions with the officers in the brigade S3 section were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and motivated by Castillo. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the brigade S3. Castillo supposedly focuses on the hot issues of the day with little long range planning. They also mentioned Castillo’s unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Castillo indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of whom was new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Frazer, he responded, “Hell, that’s just Castillo flexing his muscle. His system works and there’s no better brigade S3 in the division and everyone knows it. Those battalion officers need to quit sniveling and get to work.”

 

In a private conversation last week, CSM Kuptain mentioned, “I’m worried about my senior non-commissioned officers. They appear competent but I don’t see any results from their work. They are sick and tired of the constant barrage of taskers and they don’t believe anything they do is making a difference. There is no priority. Yesterday it was that, today it is this. Tomorrow it will be something else. There appears to be little teamwork among them and their officers. When I ask them why they don’t speak up and get involved, they ask, ‘Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.’”     

 

As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on potential incidents of sexual harassment within the brigade. The conversation centers around one of the “superstar” company commanders, CPT Seth Cooper. As a platoon leader, he was in charge of the personal security detachment (PSD) for COL Eldar. After the deployment, COL Eldar placed CPT Cooper in command ahead of other senior captains waiting for command. The consensus from the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel with whom you spoke is CPT Cooper gets results and is popular with battalion and brigade leaders. Every battalion commander requested CPT Cooper be assigned to his or her battalion after the deployment. However, at least four individuals stated, “CPT Cooper really got around while he was on the PSD.” Another stated, “CPT Cooper had a girlfriend at every FOB.” When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Frazer he dismisses the issue by stating “CPT Cooper is very friendly, a real extrovert. Besides, the only person that mentioned anything approaching a complaint was a sub-par Soldier, so COL Eldar dismissed the allegation.”

 

You also found out the ABCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas, domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. While the ABCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases, there is no plan for prevention. The organization seems to be in react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. She mentions to you that the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the last deployment and an (operating tempo) OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. The chaplain believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade, with some cases among members of the brigade staff still ongoing. COL Eldar’s response to the chaplain’s concern about these allegations was simply, “Those are only rumors. Don’t bring me that stuff without proof!”

 

Finally, your informal conversations with friends within the division suggest the 4^th gained a reputation in Afghanistan for being very “heavy-handed” in dealing with locals. While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place/transition of authority, their behavior took a marked downturn after the death of the brigade command team and battalion commander. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade’s ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, “Frazer’s negative attitude of the Afghans created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it’s still there. COL Eldar only made things worse with his hyperbole and force-oriented approach to the security in the ABCT area of operations. You need to be very careful.”

 

The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone numerous changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and Center for the Army Profession and Leadership (CAPL) assessments, and conversations and observations provided some much-needed information. You know there is not much time before the NTC rotation or when the brigade assumes the ERI mission and there are still many unknowns associated with this new requirement. As you begin to reflect on your upcoming assumption of command you know you need to identify the challenges you see within the brigade, which is the most significant, the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and measure success.

 

Requirement: 

 

See the L100 take home exam question and grading rubric. The exam question and the grading rubric will be available on Blackboard IAW the class schedule.

 

 

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