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Discussion Board Topic
1) Explain the mind/body problem. Why is it a problem? Do you think it can be adequately solved within the confines of Descartes’ dualism? If you answer yes, then explain why. If you answer no, then explain why not.
2) Explain the Identity Thesis. Do you think the Identity theses solves the mind/body problem in an adequate manner? If you answer yes, then explain why. If you answer no, then explain why not.
3) Which do you think is most defensible: Physicalism or Dualism? Offer an argument in defense of your answer.
1) Explain Edmund Gettier’s argument from his article, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Present an argument either in defense or against Edmund Gettier’s objections to the justified-true-belief notion of knowledge.2) Explain Peter Unger’s argument from his piece, An Argument for Skepticism. Do you think Peter Unger is correct to claim that certainty is required for knowledge? If so, then offer an argument in defense of his position. If not, then offer an argument in objection to his position.
3) Does Descartes argument about his own existence give us reason to reject Unger’s claim that certainty requires one to be dogmatic, and thus it is unreasonable to claim certainty? If so, then offer an argument in defense of this position. If not, then offer an argument in objection to this position.
Answer the set of questions above in a minimum of one paragraph each
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| Subject | Philosophy | Pages | 2 | Style | APA |
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Answer
Discussion Board Post
Question 1
Descartes’ philosophy of the distinctness between the body and the mind results to the mind/body problem especially because of the conclusion that the mind is thinking, but not extended. In contrast, the body is extended but not thinking, which means they are entirely different, and one can exist without the other. It is a problem because it results in the mind-body causal interaction, which seeks to determine the relationship between the two distinct entities as perceived by Descartes (Rozemond & Rozemond, 2009). Nonetheless, the problem can be solved through the confines of Descartes’ dualism. The explanation of modes and substances helps in understanding the possibility of the mind and the body remaining distinct but acting on each other to influence human reasoning and activities.
Question 2
Identity thesis is a philosophical concept of modern materialism that affirms the relationship between the mind and matter with an explanation that despite being logically distinguished, they are only different expressions of a single reality that is material. In line with the mind-body problem, the identity theory presumes that the mind is but a part of the physical body. There are significantly abstract aspects of the material, which informs the mind in an extreme position, denying the mind’s existence (Strawson, 2016). Although the thesis seeks to expound on the mind-body problem, it fails to solve it adequately because of the introspective reports in terms of brain processes, which fail to express the causal relationship between the mind and the body.
Question 3
Despite the incompleteness of both dualism and physicalism in expounding their philosophical concepts and ideas, those propagated by physicalism are more defensible compared to dualism. While dualism points out that the mind and the body are completely and are independent of each other, contrary opinions arise from physicalism that supposes that the mind and the body are primarily the same thing, dependent. Although the ideas of physicalism may not be true, I find it more compelling since they both interact and have a mutual dependence in some way, which means that they cannot be completely separate as presumed by dualism.
Question 4
The Justified True Belief Knowledge is a philosophical concept that attempts to offer an assertion that for someone to be said to know something, they must satisfy a set of indispensable and satisfactory conditions. In other words, this concept supposes that if a person p has a belief b, if b is, in fact, true, and if p is justified in believing b, then p knows that b. However, in Gettier’s various case arguments, the possibility of a person having justified true beliefs without knowledge becomes vivid (Coliva & Belleri, 2018). His objection to the justified true belief knowledge holds ground because of the difficulty in developing a rationalized definition of justification. Therefore, Gettier’s problem has its solution in the “J” part of the analogy.
Question 5
In his piece, an argument for skepticism, Peter Unger provides an appeal to a logical possibility, which alludes that certainty is necessary for knowledge. That is, he built his argument in two premises that the knowledge would definitely entitle the knower to absolute certainty and that any attitude of absolute certainty is objectionable from an epistemic point of view. Although Unger does very little to explain the meaning of knowledge in this context, his advocacy for philosophical skepticism assists in building on the need for certainty in knowledge (Stoutenburg, 2017). He is, therefore, correct to assert that certainty is required for knowledge since it is only through that that reason occupies its rightful place.
Question 6
Descartes’ argument concerning his existence is not proof enough to reject Unger’s claims since absolute dogmatism would mean an elimination of logic, which then becomes unreasonable. Essentially, despite the need to have certainty, it is never right for an individual to claim absolute certainty. This means that by claiming absolute certainty about his existence, Descartes falls in danger of involving logic and reason. That is, it is through Unger’s sentiments that the premises conclude to universal skepticism.
References
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Coliva, A., & Belleri, D. (2018). The Gettier problem and context. Rozemond, M., & Rozemond, M. (2009). Descartes's dualism. Harvard University Press. Stoutenburg, G. (2017). Unger's Argument from Absolute Terms. Philosophical Papers, 46(3), 443-461. Strawson, G. (2016). Hume on Personal Identity. In The Oxford Handbook of Hume (p. 269). Oxford University Press.
Appendix
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