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QUESTION
1st AD OE in ATROPIA-OPORD Phase III tasks Annex B, and Annex C3a
Need to create a power point presentation using Elements of Operational Design broken down into these areas: Decisive Points, Lines of Operation/Lines of Effort, Direct and indirect approach, Anticipation.
Please used the attached information to build this power point again using Operational Design defining each of these areas.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY HQ, 1st Armored Division TBLISI, REPUBLIC OF GORGAS 14 September 2015 ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)
B-1 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY
(U) References:
a.(U) Maps
b.ADRP 2-0 “Intelligence,” August 2012
c.FM 6-0 “Commander and Staff Organization and Operations,” May 2014
d.Decisive Action Training Environment 2.1
(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan/Order: ZULU
1.(U) Situation. Refer to base OPORD.
a.(U) Area of Interest. Refer to base OPORD
b.(U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
(1). (U) Terrain. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate). (2). (U) Weather. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)(Not provided, use local light and weather data).
c.(U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Appendix 1 (Intel Estimate).
d.(U) Friendly Forces.
(1). (U) Without assistance Atropia’s military and border forces will have a minimal level of success in defeating a Donovian (DON) invasion.
(2). (U) Coalition. Refer to base OPORD and Annex C (Operations) for current US/coalition force situation.
e.(U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Refer to Annex K (CivilAffairs Operations).
f.(U) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations).
g.(U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization)
2.(U) Mission. The 1st AD Intelligence War-fighting Function provides timely, accurate and predictiveintelligence to support the commander’s objectives and to meet the information needs of subordinateunits planning and execution of Decisive Action operations.
3.(U) Execution.
a.(U) Scheme of Intelligence Support. Refer to Annex L (Information Collection).
b.(U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Refer to Appendix 2 (Information Collection Tasking Matrix) toAnnex L (Information Collection).
c.(U) Counterintelligence. Refer to Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence).
d.(U) Coordinating Instructions.
(1). (U) Requirements.
(a). (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).
1.(U) PIR 1. Will OSC-S send the 81st Division Tactical Group (DTG) along Avenue ofApproach (AA) 5?
2.(U) PIR 2. Will OSC-S send the 81st DTG along AA1?
3.(U) PIR 3. Will OSC-S send the 98th DTG along AA5?
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)
B-2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY
4.(U) PIR 4. Will the OSC-S commit forces to Erdabil Province?
5.(U) PIR 5. Have Donovian forces penetrated any BCT’s defenses?
6.(U) PIR 6. Has OSC-S committed the exploitation force (81st or 98th Armored DTG)south of the International Border?
(b). (U) Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIR). Refer to base OPORD.
(c). (U) Requests for Information (RFI). RFIs can be sent digitally via SIPR to 1st AD G2 or via LNO.
(2). (U) Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel.
(a). (U) Prisoners of War, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons. The detaining element(s) will notify 1st AD via FM immediately to report the name of the detainee and the reason for detention IAW the reporting format in Appendix 13 (Internment and Resettlement Operations) to Annex C (Operations). Report incident where excessive force was used against civilians, women, children, mobs and rioters. Use only the minimum force and gradually increase force as necessary when detaining a civilian. Refer to Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations). If individuals are found with evidence and equipment such as weapons, capturing unit personnel detain the individuals in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Capturing units tag the detainees and the equipment using a Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag). Capturing units account for the evidence on Department of the Army (DA) Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document). Capturing unit maintains and transports evidence with the detainee to maintain its association with the detainee to include photographs showing the evidence and the detainee in the same picture.
(b). (U) Captured Documents. Report immediately to 1st AD G2 any captured and/or exploited documents indicating attack against U.S. Forces, Atropian military forces or infrastructure, or any exploited documents that can further answer 1st AD PIR or support Decisive Action operations. Summaries of any documents found should be included in the daily GRINTSUM. Examples of captured documents are address books, daily planners, maps, receipts, notebooks, loose scraps of papers, etc. Account for the documents at the time the document comes into U.S. Forces possession. Original documents must not be marked, altered or defaced in any way and may contain biometric data. Capturing unit at each echelon should wear gloves to preserve potential evidence. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), Part C, to each document, as well as DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag). In addition to the Capture Tag, use the DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) for accountability of material during transportation. Documents captured in association with detainees and EPWs, with the exception of identity documents, are removed from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not destroyed. The documents need to be forwarded to 1st AD G2 DOMEX Team for further exploitation, archival and production of the appropriate document exploitation report to be disseminated back to the capturing unit via the Intelligence Staff section on the 1st AD Web Portal or the Theater Exploitation Database (TED), which can be accessed via the TED link on the 1st AD Web Portal.
(c). (U) Captured Material. Report immediately to 1st AD G2 any captured materials, electronic storage media, or military equipment that can assist in further supporting Decisive Action operations or that may contain any threat or indication of attack against U.S. Forces, Atropian military forces or infrastructure. Summaries of any materials, storage media or equipment found should be included in the daily GRINTSUM. Examples of electronic storage media are thumb drives, computers, compact disks; Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards, high power cordless phones, etc. Account for the equipment at the time the equipment comes into U.S. Forces possession. All equipment must not be marked, altered or defaced in any way and no attempt to exploit the electronic storage media or cellular phone should be made unless by a qualified Multi-function Team. All equipment may contain biometric data. Capturing unit at each echelon should wear
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)
B-3 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY
gloves to preserve potential evidence. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), Part C, to each piece of equipment, as well as DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag). Communication equipment should not be altered in order to obtain a serial number. In addition to the Capture Tag, use the DA Form 4137 (Evidence/ Property Custody Document) for accountability of materiel during transportation. Media captured in association with detainees and EPWs are removed from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not destroyed. The electronic storage media will be forwarded to 1st AD G2 DOMEX Team for exploitation and production of the appropriate electronic media or cellular phone exploitation report to be disseminated back to the capturing unit via the Intelligence Staff section on the 1st AD Web Portal or the TED, which can be accessed via the TED link on the 1st AD Web Portal.
(d). (U) Documents or Equipment Required. The 1st AD G2 will validate all map requests. Brigade S2s will consolidated all map and topographic requirements and forward them on a Standard Form 344 to the 1st AD G2 for approval. Any other requests for products refer to 1st AD TACSOP.
(3). (U) Distribution of Intelligence Products. Subordinate units may use their existing standardized products for intelligence sharing to 1st AD G2.
(a). (U) Graphic Intelligence Summary (GRINTSUM). Daily Division GRINTSUM (period covered: 0001-2400) are disseminated NLT 1200 local time via the 1st AD G2 webpage. Subordinate units will provide their daily GRINTSUM (period covered: 0001-2400) to 1st AD G2 NLT 0600 local time each day digitally. Minimum requirements for GRINTSUM must include a summary of all significant activity within their AOI, a current near-term assessment of the AOI, and a rollup of all reporting across every intelligence discipline (SIGINT, HUMINT, and any interrogation summaries) originating within the AOR during the last 24 hrs.
(b). (U) Weather Outlooks, Advisories, and Warnings. Weather Outlooks are issued to subordinate units NLT 0900 local time daily via 1st AD G2 webpage. Any Weather Advisories/ Warnings will be issued via FM or VIOP, as the preferred method, but any form of dissemination can be utilized, as necessary.
4.(U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).
5.(U) Command and Signal.
a.(U) Command.
(1). (U) Location of the Commander and Key Leaders.
(a). (U) G2 located at Division Main
(b). (U) Deputy G2 located at Division Main
(c). (U) TAC Deputy G2 located at TAC
(d). (U) G2X located at Division Main
(2). (U) Succession of Command. Refer to the 1st AD TACSOP
(3). (U) Liaison Requirements. 1st AD does not require separate intelligence liaison personnel from subordinate units. Intelligence liaison duties can be executed by unit LNOs.
b.(U) Control.
(1). (U) Command Posts.
(2). (U) Intelligence Coordination Line. Subordinate units’ operational boundaries are considered ICLs for subordinate units.
(3). (U) Special Security. Special Security Office (SSO) requirements are directed by the 1st AD G2, SSO.
(4). (U) Reports. Refer to Annex R (Reports).
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 1st AD OPORD 14-01 (ATROPIAN IRON) (UNCLASSIFIED)
B-4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY
c.(U) Signal. Refer to Annex H (Signal).
ACKNOWLEDGE:
NOLL
MG
OFFICIAL:
SWANN
G2
APPENDICES:
Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
Tab A (Terrain) Tab B (Light-Weather) – Not Provided (Use local light and weather data.).Tab C (Civil Considerations) – Not Provided Tab D (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products) – Not Provided Exhibit 1 (Enemy Order of Battle) Exhibit 2 (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay – MCOO) Exhibit 3 (Enemy Courses of Action)
Appendix 2 (Information Collection Tasking Matrix) – Refer to Annex L (Information Collection) – AnL2
Appendix 3 (Counter Intelligence)
Appendix 4 (Signals Intelligence)
Appendix 5 (Human Intelligence)
Appendix 6 (Geospatial Intelligence)
| Subject | Law and governance | Pages | 5 | Style | APA |
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Answer
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Elements of Operational Design
1st AD OE in ATROPIA-OPORD
Elements of operational design comprises of a list of aspects that should be present after a Course of Action (COA) is developed. It is a systematic arrangement of major strategic and operational tasks that ought to be accomplished and in an order in which they are supposed to be accomplished. It also outlines the capabilities required and the tasks and organizational related communication systems support ideologies for military operations. Most importantly, elements of operational design define sustainment concepts for the military operations.
Decisive Points
- Often geographic in nature but can at times comprise of key events and systems
- Provides a marked advantage to a person in control of the system
- Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity
- They are not part of COG but are key to attacking and protecting combatants
A decisive point is a geographical place, specific key event, critical factor or function that when acted upon permits a commander to gain advantage over an adversary. Further more, a decisive point contributes material resources to achieving success in military operations. Decisive points produce the desired effect to achieving a particular objective during military operations. Decisive points are the keys to attacking or protecting the combatants during military operations despite that they are not part of the center of gravity (COG).
Direct and Indirect Approach
- Direct approach means attacking an enemy’s COG directly
- Indirect approach means that an enemy’s COG is attacked indirectly
- Direct approaches are not effective enough to the COG thereby prompting the use of indirect approach
- Indirect approach applies a sequence of techniques that weakens an enemy’s COG
This approach occurs in a manner such that the commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the center of gravity or the principal strength for the enemy by using combatant power directly against the enemy. The COG is, however, properly protected and invulnerable to the use of direct approach. This factor makes commanders to prefer indirect approaches in their operations whereby an indirect approach attacks the COG of an enemy by using combat power against a sequence of approaches that defeats or weakens the COG and avoid the strength of the enemy.
Lines of Operation/Effort
- Lines of operations are geographical destinations that link multiple tasks and missions
- They apply logic of purpose-cause and effect
- Lines of efforts are conceptual lines between the base and objective of operations
- Lines of operations and efforts focus operations towards attaining operational/strategic effect
The lines of operations/effect are imaginary lines between the base of operations for the forces and objective. However, the positional reference of the lines of operation was found to have little effect to the enemy creating the term “logical” lines of operations. The lines of operations were since changed into geographical destinations that are different from the imaginary lines of efforts. Their purpose is to link multiple tasks and missions by applying the logic or purpose and effect to establish operations under strategic conditions.
Anticipation
- Effective planning by expecting occurrence of various events
- It involves being ready to take advantage of a particular situation
- Analyze the course and effect of phenomena by gathering information from various sources
- Getting prepared all the time for a possible attack or opportunity to attack
- Anticipation is the crucial factor to effective planning. The commanders have to consider things that might happen and analyze the signs that may make the events to happen. The joint force commander (JFC) should remain alert for unexpected occurrence and opportunities for exploiting the situation during the execution of military operations. They consistently gather information by communication with the headquarters and other organizations and agencies working in collaboration with the respective military activities.
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References
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1st AD OE in ATROPIA-OPORD Phase III tasks Annex B, and Annex C3a
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- QUESTION
Week 4 Discusssion
This is a discussion question that I need answered. I need the second portion of the questioned answered thoroughly, both bullet points. I have highlighted it in yellow to show that it is what I need answered. I need this r returned to me completed without any grammatical or punctual errors. The company that I want this question written about is Nissan Motor Corporation. Choose ONE of the following discussion question options to respond to:
Using Adverse Conditions to a Company’s Advantage
- Chakravorti (2010) discusses four methods that corporate innovators use to turn adverse conditions to their advantage. Examine an organization of your choice and briefly discuss how the organization might use one of these methods.
-OR-
Assessing Risk and Reward
- Using the company of your choice, identify an important and difficult decision that they faced. What were the most important risks and the most important rewards of the decision?
- What data, analysis or perspective would you have used to help Sr. Management decide if the rewards outweighed the risks?
| Subject | Business | Pages | 4 | Style | APA |
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Answer
Assessing Risk and Reward
The Nissan Motor Company is one of the leading automobile makers in the world. The Japanese carmaker has primarily enjoyed a successful run, allowing it to enter various regional and international markets such as the United States. However, the changing business environment was not favorable to the company in 2019. Notably, the cooperation recorded losses amounting to 7.8%. The experience pushed the management into making tough decisions, requiring almost all of its North American workforce to go for unpaid leaves.
In late 2019, the company announced that the decline in sales necessitated a two-day unpaid leave for the North American workers. The stated days for the vacation were January 2 and 3rd (Chicago Tribune, 2019). Notably, this move was a crucial decision for the company because of its conflicting impacts. Whereas on the positive side, it could help the firm minimize expenses, it threatened to affect the public perception of the company regarding employee welfare.
The rewards for the decision involved cutting expenses by not paying the workers on leave, which eventually would translate into reduced expenses. Another reward was that the decision could allow the company to optimize performance by evaluating employee performances then developing new milestones. However, on the low side, the company risked affecting its public image and brand name, especially in the North American market. As per Chakravorti (2010), the way an organization treats its employees influences the firm’s public perception. Thus, Nissan risked eliciting a negative public perception. With a distorted public image, the company could fail to revive its declining sales.
I would have advised the management of Nissan to utilize the Predictive Analytic perspective in determining the right decision to take. Ideally, the approach tries to predict what might happen in the future if particular decisions or actions are undertaken at the moment (Traymbak & Aggarwal, 2019). Looking at the situation at Nissan, the company needed to develop a goal such as increasing sales. After that, they would have made decisions aimed at realizing the set goal. In this regard, the predicted outcome could give the management an overview of whether more risks existed or significant rewards could be realized.
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References
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Marcus, L. J., Dorn, B. C., & Henderson, J. M. (2005). 3 Meta-Leadership And National Emergency Preparedness Strategies To Build Government Connectivity.
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