Analysis of an Employment Discrimination Case: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. – 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)

Cause: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. – 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)

Organization Involved

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie)

Facts of the Case

Headquartered in Albany, Ohio, Abercrombie is an American chain of clothing stores that concentrates on casual wear (Akhtar, 2019). The retailer requires its staff to adhere to its “Look Policy” that spells out the retailer’s style as well as prohibits caps and black clothing, despite the fact that the policy does not defines what a cap implies (Ruszkowski, 2019).

In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a 17-year old lady then, applied for an employment opportunity at Abercrombie’s Tulsa, Oklahoma based store. During her interview by the company, Elauf was dressed in a headscarf, yet never explained why (Griffiths, 2016). Heather Cooke, the woman who was interviewing her, initially got impressed with her, though with concerns regarding Elauf’s scarf. Cooke explained to the store’s manager that the Elauf was dressed in the scarf for spiritual reasons. However, the manager was adamant at the reason, arguing that employees were to be permitted to wear hats while at work, and thus failed to hire her (Harper, 2015).  Elauf, a practicing Muslim, never indicated that she would require an accommodation from the company’s Look Policy (Akhtar, 2019). Similarly, her interviewers never mentioned something about the scarf.

In 2009, Abercrombie was sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of Elauf. EEOC asserted that Abercrombie had dishonored 1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights by failing to employ Elauf because of her scarf (Ruszkowski, 2019). The company posited that it was within Elauf’s duty to inform her interviewers that she needed accommodation from Abercrombie’s Look Policy and that her scarf was never an expression of frankly held religious belief (Griffiths, 2016). A lawsuit was, thus, filed in a federal district court that and Elauf obtained a $20,000 in damages (Akhtar, 2019). Nonetheless, the 10^th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed the decision by the federal court in favour of Abercrombie based on the fact that Elauf never informed the company about her requirement for an accommodation in its Look Policy (Ruszkowski, 2019). The Supreme Court of the U.S. rejected Abercrombie’s assertions that it never violated the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act since Elauf had not indicated the company’s “actual knowledge” of the need to be accommodated since the need for accommodation should have only been a motivating factor in a staff’s decision (Harper, 2015).  Nevertheless, the 10^th Circuit Court, in reversing the ruling, stated that obligation for failure to put up with Elauf is only applicable after a potential worker requests to be accommodated by the employer (Akhtar, 2019).

Case Analysis

According to Akhtar (2019), the 1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Stat. 253, as amended, forbids two kinds of employment practices: disparate treatment (also referred to as intentional discrimination) provision as well as disparate impact provision. Title VII prevents discrimination based upon religion, sex, colour, race, national origin, or categorization of applicants or employees for employment under any circumstance that could tend to rob a person of employment openings or else impact employment adversely (Griffiths, 2016). From the forgoing legal positions, to triumph in a disparate-treatment, Griffiths (2016) reasons that an applicant should only show their need for an accommodation was an appealing factor in the decision of the employer, and not that the employer had an understanding or knowledge of their need.  The disparate-treatment provision of Title VII needed Elauf to demonstrate that Abercrombie: (i) did not hire her (ii) because of (iii) religion (Harper, 2015). Ruszkowski (2019) argues that it is “because of” standard is comprehended to imply that the safeguarded feature cannot be an appealing factor in a hiring process. Thus, as opposed to imposing a knowledge standard 2000e-2(a)(1) forbids some motives, notwithstanding the state of the actor’s understanding or knowledge:  an employer may never make a religious practice of an applicant a factor within employment decision making, confirmed or not (Harper, 2015). Griffiths (2016) points out that Title VII encapsulates no knowledge need, adding that Title VII’s religion definition vividly shows that failure-to-accommodate issues or challenges can be considered as disparate-treatment assertions.  Title VII provides favoured consideration for religious practices, as opposed to demanding that spiritual practices should be considered as no worse than other non-religious practices (Akhtar, 2019). It was, therefore, essential to demonstrate that the employer did have actual knowledge about the applicant’s requirement for an accommodation so that they could establish disparate-treatment under 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Contrarily, it was needful to demonstrate that the requirement of accommodation of the applicant was an appealing factor in the employer’s employment decision of the applicant; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(2) states that an assertion founded upon failure to put up with a religious practice never had to be presented as a disparate impact as opposed to disparate-treatment assertion, since religious practices were safeguarded features that could never be conferred disparate treatment.

Outcome/Resolution

On 1^st June 2015, in a 8-1 ruling, the Supreme Court favoured Elauf. According to Antonin Scalia, and associate Justice, the Supreme Court alleged that Elauf never had to unambiguously make an accommodation request to get security from the 1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights, which forbids religious discrimination when recruiting employees (Ruszkowski, 2019). Justice Samuel Alito concurred with the Court’s verdict, indicating that proof of Abercrombie’s knowledge regarding Elauf’s religious practice(s) was enough grounds upon which to rule against the company (Harper, 2015). In part, Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented and concurred the verdict, arguing that the interpretation by the majority of the judges that Title VII safeguards one against intentional discrimination against some specific spiritual group, yet held a feeling that Abercrombie never really engaged in that in this case since their Look Policy was a religion-neutral dress code that impacted all possible employees (Griffiths, 2016). According to Thomas, the application of a neutral policy can never make up intentional discrimination that infringes Title VII. Despite the fact that the strict employment of Abercrombie’s policy may have unreasonably impacted those who wear scarves for religious reasons, Abercrombie’s policy still treated all potential employees to the company in a similar manner, and thus Elauf who was not hired based on her religious scarf never suffered from disparate treatment (Harper, 2015). Thomas equally contended that the statutory language ought to be narrowly constructed so that it only penalizes employers and companies that act with discriminatory motive(s).

Since both parties agreed that Elauf did wear a scarf as a component of her religious practice, the U.S. Court only had the duty of evaluating whether Abercrombie did fail to employ her due of the religious practice. Abercrombie contended that parties have the obligation of raising failure to accommodate assertions as disparate-impact , as opposed to disparate-treatment. The Court did reject this assertion since Title VII defines religion as including both practice and belief (Ruszkowski, 2019). Therefore, religious practices are safeguarded and have to be accommodated. Similarly, Abercrombie contended that neutral policy can never quality as an international discrimination. Nonetheless, Title VII, as the Court highlighted, bestows on employers an affirmative responsibility of accommodating and not refusing/failing to employ a worker due to her/his religious practice, as opposed to mere neutrality with reference to religious practices (Harper, 2015). Thus, in a 8-1 verdict, the U.S. Supreme Court did overrule the 10^th Circuit’s grant summary ruling, and remanded the case for verdict in accordance with its ruling.

National Legislation Changed As A Result Of The Case?

The result of the ruling is that the Supreme Court led to the expansion of religious expressions since it affirmed that a discrimination victim needs to demonstrate actual knowledge of or awareness for a need for accommodation of religious practices and beliefs (Ruszkowski, 2019). Similarly, an applicant has the onus of showing that his/her need for accommodation was an appealing factor within the employer’s employment decision not to hire the employee’s  prospective, and not that the employer knew of his/her need (Griffiths, 2016). Thus, the case is important since it establishes a persuasive or binding precedent on all lower U.S. courts or within its jurisdiction.