Answer

Language and Communication

Using your own example(s) of malapropisms in action and drawing on his notions of prior and passing theory, explain how and why Davidson concludes that there is no such thing as a language (as we tend to know it). Outline and defend your position on his view.

            Donald Davidson maintains that language does not exist. Despite this being considered a surprising assertion in its right, it appears to be puzzling since it comes from one of the prominent language theorists. For several years, Davidson came up with important essays that have provided a notion that there is a course to a constructive and non-skeptical system of significance for natural languages. However, hope seems to have hastened with Davidson’s position that natural languages are inexistent (Bar-On & Risjord, 1992). Davidson’s work maintains that a common language presented in the structure of conventions is not essential to provide an explanation of verbal communication. This paper derives an argument that Davidson’s conclusion can be avoided through varied amendments. Moreover, the paper maintains a position that Davidson’s arguments are ambiguous and his conclusions about conventionality cannot be defended, even under his definitions. The chosen malapropism for this analysis is “opens the window” and the listener locks the door.

            The argument set forth by Davidson against language’s necessity is founded on the validity of the general descriptions he establishes about linguistic communication. According to Davidson (1986), the speaker’s and the interpreter’s understanding of the communicator’s words is what must be shared. For this to be achieved, even if the interpreter relies on the prior theory of the meaning held by certain words, and the speaker considers the prior theory of what the explainer’s prior theoretical frame can be, the communication process will not succeed. However, the process of communication can only succeed depending on the convergence of how the communicator actually intends her arguments to be assumed (as reflected under the utterer’s passing theory) and the ascribed meaning by the transcriber (translator’s passing theory) (Davidson,1986). If Davidson’s stand is accurate, then only the conjunction of the passing philosophies from the two parties will be considered requisite for a successful process of communication. Despite this, it is still a fact that this necessity does not provide an implication that language is also essential.

            Prior systems are considered as worthy candidates for language. This is mainly founded on the fact that they conform to the necessity that language is an existent aspect is reflected in the manner of communication. This factor is reflected by the fact that the prior theories conform with the aspect that language is prior to a definite dialectal communication. Based on Davidson’s argument, it is evident that it is not a requirement that the prior theories should tie (Davidson, 1986). However, with malapropisms, it can be established that engaging to the ordinary way of communication that people understand specific words will make the communicator’s words seem illogical or contradictory if not unintelligible, when depend on on non-standard denotations to make words sensible. Finding necessary non-standard meanings which coincide with the meanings that the communicator intended to relay, the passing theories merge, and hence communication is allowed to thrive without the necessity for having the prior theories matching. Therefore, communication will not rely on the aspect of a shared convention as a necessary consideration.

However, this is not the case based on the fact that even when prior theories slightly deviate, they still share a similar focus against which mistakes can be established and interpreted. Therefore, this objects Davidson’s findings regarding the prior theories and communication. This would discourage the utilization of malapropisms and comparable errors as arguments unless a way of providing  demonstration that their interpretation does not rely on the conventions of knowledge is provided. Furthermore, this factor would force Davidson to offer proof regarding the possibility of communication even in the events where the prior theories completely differ. Notably, this suggests that Davidson would have to offer a demonstration about the possibility of communication even in the events where people can depend on no understanding of any kind regarding the communicator’s language or any other aspect that can be understood about the speaker through language (Davidson, 1986). Arguably, these are conditions under which the radical clarification is needed to occur.

If communication can be effective in the events where the prior models fundamentally differ, it is simply because the passing philosophies can unite during the course of the process of communication. With this factor, it can be derived that of something was to be referred to as language, then it would have to be a passing theory. However, it is not mandatory that passing theories should be permanent. Therefore, as long as a framework which makes the system of passing philosophies to possibly converge, no necessity exists for the passing philosophy to last longer than a solitary encounter experienced between the translator and the communicator. Although it may turn out to be inefficient, from a theoretical perspective, the utterer and the translator might be forced to resume the whole procedure that result to the merging at every single instance the parties interact through the use of language, and communication would still be successful, even if considered slow and painful.  Referring to a passing theory as language would suggest that we would have to deliberate every passing philosophy’s encounter as a new language. As a result, people would be required to consider every reasonable malapropism and error, provided they suggest an alteration within the translator’s passing theory as one which results to language modification. Therefore, a solitary discussion would arise in variety of languages. As a result, the language concept would be considered to be rather useless (Davidson, 1986).

Looking at the arguments, it is evident that the need for communication language can be considered as untruthful if Davidson provides a framework that allows the passing philosophies to unite even in the events where there are no instances of prior shared elements. Therefore, unless a demonstration can be provided about the possibility of interpreting the communicator whose language is unknown, there is no reason to accept Davidson’s argument that language is inexistent. Despite this it is evident that even with the existence of such mechanism, Davidson’s argument holds. However, by itself, it is evident that it fails to prove anything of a great interest by itself. From a philosophical sense, it is evident that conventions are necessary in communication. Davidson has failed to provide an example of a form of communication without convention. However, he asserts that the knowledge of language concords is a real crutch to clarification (Davidson, 1994).

 It is a fact that there is no normativity in Davidson’s standing signifying that language does not exist. Arguably, meaning should be normative (Engel, 2008). When it becomes difficult to differentiate if using words is erroneous or right, then there is strategy of trusting that a person is in concurrence with the condition from being in agreement with the rule. This challenge is reflected in the argument presented by Davidson about the inexistence of language with a primary focus on successful communication, outlined under the intention of the speaker during the communication process. It is evident that the communication process must have proven to be a success. However, the listener may not have understood the communication message being relayed. For instance, the speaker may have stated “open the window” while the listener opens the door out of malice (Penco, 2007).

            It is not clear where normativity should instigate from. Notably, it cannot directly arise from the use of language based on the fact that whatever usage one employs would offer a validation for its use. In other view, the facts of usage are considered as descriptive. Normativity can also originate from some platonic realm. Despite this, it is evident that in such cases, the dialogue party is not considered as the existing resourceful power behind the meanings. It is a fact that Davidson rejects the argument that means can be normative. Evidently, Davidson provides an argument that there is no difference between meaning and reasoning norms. Therefore, when a speaker utilizes a term in unusually, it can be accredited to a circumstance of meaning misunderstanding a well as its application. In this case, Davidson is considered to hold a pessimistic position since there should be normativity in meaning. Jackman (2004) supports this by deriving that norms should be extensively robust to be binding. Any person who means anything by their words will lack the capability of opting out of the norms presented.