Explain two-level game by Using Cyprus negotiations as example".

Answer

An Explanation of a Two-Level Game Using Cyprus’ Negotiations as Example

According to Putnam (1988), the politics of several international negotiations can significantly be perceived as a two-level game. At the international stage, national administrations focus on the maximization of their potentials to gratify domestic pressures, while limiting the adverse impacts of foreign advancements. At the domestic stage, domestic factions focus on meeting their interests by compelling the government to embrace favorable regulations, and politicians pursue power by forming alliances among those factions (Putnam, 1988). As such, central decision-makers cannot afford to overlook any of these games granted their nations remain can be overlooked codependent, yet self-governing. In a two level-game, every national political leader takes part in both game boards (Putnam, 1988).  The leader’s foreign counterparts sit crosswise the international table, while the leader’s diplomats along with other international advisors sit at his or her elbows.  The leader’s political advisors, parliamentary and party figures, key interest groups’ representatives, and domestic agencies’ spokespersons sits around the native or domestic table located behind him or her. Putnam (1988) argues that the unusual complexity that characterizes a two-level game is that actions, which are considered rational for a party at one board as in the case of limiting auto imports, conceding territory, and raising energy prices, may be deemed impolitic for that part at the different board. Nonetheless, there exist powerful incentives for constancy between the games. Putnam (1988) asserts that players will endure certain differences within in pomposity between the games. However, in the end, energy prices can rise or fail to rise. Therefore, the political complexities for players in a two-level game are confounding. Any of the key parties at the international table who happens to be disgruntled with the results may distraught the game board. In the same manner, any leader who does not gratify his or her fellow players at the native table faces the risk of being ejected from his or her seat (Putnam, 1988). Nevertheless, in certain occasions, players can identify an action on one of the boards that will induce realignments of players on other boards, thereby allowing them to accomplish otherwise unachievable goals.

The illustration of a two-level game provided by Putnam (1988) can be employed in the context of Cyprus negotiations. Ozkaleli & Hasguler (2013) argue that Cyprus conflict represents a multifaceted, two-level game within a democratic environment characterized by high costs of audience, which makes leaders extremely sensitive to their constituencies’ widespread demands. These constituencies oppose the agreement founded on the inclusive, top-down strategy embraced by the United Nations. The complexity of the two-level game evidenced by the Cyprus conflict lies in the fact that not only Cyprus players act different, entrenched games, but the external players with the ability to change the winset can influence the result for the worse or for the better. As such, the complexity characterizing the Cyprus game is considered a by-product of its vulnerability to third-party intermediations, both at the public opinion and leadership levels. Nevertheless, the description of the Cyprus struggle as a two-level game cannot take into consideration all the elements of the conflict (Ozkaleli & Hasguler, 2013). This argument holds because along with the two primary communities within Cyprus, several other state players such as Russia, Turkey, Israel, Germany, Russia, Britain, Greece, and international organization like the United Nations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have stake owing to the geo-strategic significance of the Island.  Besides, certain parameters associated with the condition have a significant potential of being manipulated by a third-party. Ozkaleli & Hasguler (2013) assert that manipulations have been witnessed in several instances at very perilous moments, as was seen during the popular ballot for the Annan Plan. In general, Cyprus can be considered a two-level game characterized by the needs of actors to balance the needs for a remedy with the interests of their domestic or home constituencies.