What can studying non-literal meaning tell us about the nature of meaning? In particular, how important is non-literal meaning to questions of understanding?
We have encountered several types of non-literal meaning: implicature, humor, sarcasm, social meaning, kennings, and metaphor. Relevant authors to
consider discussing in depth include Cicero, Lakoff and Johnson, Grice, Camp, Labov, and Eckert. In addition, the authors we’ve read who have talked about
the role of meaning in science, computation, and thought have all concentrated on literal meaning. For instance, Bacon’s most compelling criticism of
language has to do with how well the concepts expressed by the literal meaning of words do or don’t fit the natural world (his example was the concept
expressed by the word wet); likewise, Whorf, Everett, and Gordon argue purely on the basis of literal meaning that language constrains thought; and nothing
in Searle’s arguments depends on whether the Chinese input included meaning beyond simple literal meaning. Certainly non-literal meaning is some of the
most fun and interesting part of meaning, and artistic works depend heavily on it. But how important is non-literal meaning to questions of understanding?
To sharpen this question, imagine a person who understands literal meaning perfectly, but who never grasps implicature, humor, sarcasm, or metaphor.
Would you agree or not that this person understands language (in, say, Searle’s sense of understand)?
