Answer

Managing Army Change- Discussion Paper

1. Which imperative is the most important and why? Give an example of something that the Army could do to enhance capabilities in that domain.

The army’s most important imperative is to develop leaders in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It is important to develop army leaders who can make good decisions in an uncertain future, while utilizing incomplete information in a rapidly changing environment. Army leaders should be educated, trained and equipped to face the complex challenges posed by technology advances in the 21st century given that the threats and challenges facing the army have evolved. Leaders should also be trained and educated on subjects that do not exactly relate to army operations in order to enhance their critical thinking, which would improve their responses when faced with complicated and dangerous combat situations. Leaders are capable of anticipating future and current threats to the country’s security and implement measures to fortify the country’s military. Developing effective army leaders builds the army’s capacity to respond effectively to global threats in line with its mission of safeguarding the country and maintaining global peace.

Developing effective leaders in the army would make it much easier to achieve the other three imperatives of the Army Campaign Plan. Effective army leaders would ensure that the army has the capabilities to meet the needs of combat commanders in each military operation through modernization. For example, the Army could ensure that the number of graduate army leaders successfully graduating from the US Army Command and General Staff School increases by recruiting more graduates. The army should recruit graduates from all fields in order to increase the knowledge base of army leaders and bring different perspectives to the leadership of army units. Hiring professionals from different fields would allows the army to draw upon varied experiences in charting a way forward for army units, which would increase the army’s capacity to respond to complex challenges in difficult environments.

2. In the JCIDS process, what is the role of concepts in developing capabilities? As part of your answer, provide an example of how a concept drove an actual capability in one of the DOTMLPF domains.

The role of concepts in the JCIDS process is to help the JROC in assessing the base capabilities needed for various operations and recommended course of action to increase the military’s capabilities in each of the identified domains. The concepts used in the JCID process have the main purpose of identifying the necessary capabilities for a combatant in relation to the established performance criteria, in order to meet the requirements of each mission. The JCID process identified what each military unit requires in order to accomplish its mission objectives in any war situation. Some of the critical domains covered include the domain of land access, where it is becoming for difficult for American forces to access enemy territories because enemy forces have developed capabilities to repel American forces, which denies them access to battle territory. The JCID process has worked with the concept of access to determine the capabilities required by the American army to gain access to most enemy territories during war.

An example of how the concept of area-denial led to the development of the capability of land forces to access enemy territory, which is one of the DOTMLPF domains. This concept allowed the military to explore new ways of accessing enemy territory after enemy forces started developing anti-access capabilities on land. Some of the recommended actions include the use of other forms of access such as water and air to facilitate the capture of land areas by the army. For example, the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1980s, which transformed how the Army and the Airforce operated, followed by the introduction of maneuver warfare, which transformed the Marine Corps, relied on concepts.

3. Explain which of the six PPBE principles appear NOT to be followed in the reading, “General Odierno, AUSA Winter Symposium.”

After the reading, I believe that General Odierno’s speech did not follow principle number one, which states that the PPBE process should focus on departmental policies and activities that directly influence operations throughout the process. However, the general’s focuses on the entire army, the National Guard and the reserve army, which implies a much broader focus instead of a departmental focus. I believe that in order for the speech to adhere to the first PPBE principle, the general’s speech should address individual army unit operations or the entire army directly, while excluding the National Guards and other units mentioned. A narrower focus would make the implementation of the recommended changes more effective. The general’s speech also does not indicate whether the creation of the suggested program followed proper planning procedures.

The general’s speech proposes wide ranging reforms that affect the whole army including a reduction in personnel that has already taken place. The general does not specify the actual measures taken to ensure that the drastic reduction in army personnel would not affect the effectiveness and efficiency of army operations. I also believe that such drastic changes should better implemented over a longer duration of time after wide consultations with all stakeholders at each phase of the process to ensure that the program runs efficiently. The general does not comment on the impact of the drastic measures over the short term as well as the long term on the country security. Therefore, it is not clear whether the measures will expose the country to major security threats over the short and long term.

4. All official Army acquisition (Materiel Development) programs require an acquisition program baseline (APB).  What are the primary APB components and what assessment tools, systems, or laws do decision makers use to measure a program’s progress (or lack thereof)?

The primary APB components include the baseline description, the funding limit, the schedule, the original baseline estimate and the regulations. Decision makers use the requirements of 10 USC 2435 AND 10 USC 2220 to measure the progress of a particular program. These two laws govern the implementation of Key Performance Parameters in each DoD acquisition program because such programs must follow the correct APB in order to obtain approval. To measure the success of such programs, one compares the progress of the program in relation to the APB created at the start of the program. The APB usually contains a capability needs document that describes the capabilities to be developed by a particular program. The goals contained within the APB must meet the capabilities specified within the Capability Development/Production Document and any deviation violates 10 USC 2220, which covers the setting of program goals.

Acquisition programs that lag behind the set schedule or do not meet the thresholds set in the APB are usually subject to review in order to determine the viability of such programs. The criteria outlined in the APB as well as the requirements contained in 10 USC 2435 where the default threshold values are measured determine the success of such programs. The assessment of programs based on 10 USC 2435 relies on the threshold measures for the program specified in the APB in accordance with the code in order whether such thresholds have been exceeded. For example, program costs usually have a default threshold of 10 percent above the program budget quoted in the APB, any amounts above the threshold are subject to review, which is how the program managers keep programs costs in check.

5. Do the prioritizations outlined in the 2013 Manning Guidance agree with the imperatives of the 2013 ASPG?  Why or why not?

Most of the prioritizations of the 2013 Manning Guidance agree with the imperatives of the 2013 ASPG, while other imperatives differ slightly. One of the manning imperatives that agree with the 2013 ASPG is the imperative to maintain and improve the all-volunteer army outlined in both documents. The 2013 ASPG proposes to enhance the all-volunteer army by increasing professionalism within the army and increasing the efficiency of support programs for army personnel and their families. Other prioritizations of the 2013 Manning Guidance that agree with the 2013 ASPG are the priority to develop leaders within the army ranks who can lead the future army. The Manning Guidance specifies the importance of developing leadership capacity across all ranks, while the ASPG insists on the training of leaders in order to equip them with the skills necessary to combat the challenges that exist in the 21st century.

The Manning Guidance clearly states that the army is adequately staffed, which means that there may be no need for a reduction in the number of active forces, which is what the 2013 ASPG does by reducing personnel in most of the army divisions. Although the reduction of personnel is a priority in the 2013 Manning Guidance, it is not a priority in the 2013 ASPG. The Manning Guidance covers many areas related to the deployment of army units in various combat situations, but the 2013 ASPG barely covers army deployment methods. The Manning Guidance also specifies the management of army information and communication systems as well as coordination of units, which is an area that the ASPG ignores.
6.  How will the end of continuous operations, proposed budget cuts, and a planned reduction in Army end-strength impact the Force Generation model/process described in the F106 lesson readings?  Specifically, what major changes does the Army need to make to the existing process in order to adapt to the changing environment?

Ending continuous operations will leave the areas covered by such operations vulnerable and in the case of army operations in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the security situation in such areas might deteriorate. The proposed budget cuts would most likely lead to reduced expenditure on army infrastructure such as new fighter jets and other equipment, which might leave the army ill equipped for future wars. The planned reduction in the army’s end-strength might leave the army without adequate personnel to protect the country against future attacks given the global increase in terrorist activities. The proposed changes could leave the army exposed to many risks that put the country’s safety and security in jeopardy. Therefore, the army has to make significant changes to its operating strategies in order to accommodate the proposed changes or risk compromising the nation’s security.

Some of the major changes that the army could implement include the retraining of its officers in order to increase their effectiveness and compensate for the reduced number of officers. The training of more leaders should also commence immediately in order to cover the leadership gap left by the reduced number of soldiers by increasing the efficiency of each soldier. The army should also deal with the budget cuts by eliminating any unnecessary projects and directing funding to the core projects outlined in the ASPG. The army should adjust the Force Generation models in order to fill crucial roles within the army with personnel who can deliver excellent results, while recruiting talented soldiers to handle the complex roles of the future soldier. These strategies would ensure the continued effectiveness of the future U.S Army.
7.  Describe three ways using contractors in operations will differ from using military service members, and for each way, how a commander would overcome that difference.

Using contractors in army operations would limit the scope of authority that army commanders have over their forces because the contractors are not part of the army and the commander might have limited control over their activities. To increase the scope of control that a commander has over outside contractors, a commander should integrate the contractors as part of his unit and as such he would be directing their actions as well as those of his unit. This especially important for crucial mission where the results of the mission are the direct responsibility of the mission commander.

It is also difficult to assess the combat readiness of outside contractors, as a commander might not be aware of how well the contractors have trained in readiness for combat. This can be a significant challenge in situations where the outside contractors are in charge of crucial aspects of the mission, which must succeed. In order to ascertain the battle-readiness of contractors, the commander should request the contractors to report for the mission at least a week earlier so that he can assess their preparedness and train them on their role within the mission.

The third challenge that commanders might face while using outside contractors is the level of discipline exhibited by private contractors. Contractors might exhibit high levels of indiscipline given that they are not under the threat of a court martial and as such might pose a danger to the regular members of the army unit. To ensure that the level of discipline is uniform across the unit, the commander must get the contractors to sign a binding commitment to follow the discipline standards of the army or face appropriate legal action.