Answer

The Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil and the arguments as presented by B.C Johnson and Peter Inwagen

The existence of God and Evil is one of the philosophical problems of logical reality that many authors have tried to demystify to no avail. This problem rests under a very straightforward question: is it logical for both God and Evil to exist under the same existential atmosphere? This is a continuous debate worthy reflecting. B.C Johnson’s problem of Evil is based on the dilemmatic encounter of suffering that humanity finds itself in yet there is a being in the name of God deemed to have the power to prevent such dehumanizing evil (Johnson, & Vines, 2018).

Johnson does not find a rational explainable justification for God not to get involved to save, for example, a child in a burning house if at all he had the power (Peterson, 1997). His realm of argument is in line with suffering; if suffering is not necessary, then it is not right to permit it. On the contrary, if it is necessary, then the baby’s journey to heaven does not hold a rational justification why it is necessary (Johnson & Vines, 2018). For Johnson, it’s irrational to claim that the gods permitted the painful death of the child because it will be rewarding in the long run (Johnson & Vines, 2018). He says this is irrational because such argument prompts a perverse conclusion that whatever happens in this life is good in the long run, hence we can for instance, burn a building to kill blameless persons, and if we manage then we attribute it to be part of the plan of God. For Johnson, this undermines the belief in the existence of God.

In offering a solution to the problem of evil, Inwagen points out that the argument from evil should not be quickly pigeon-holed into two spices; logical and evidential argument (Evans, & Manis, 2010). The logical argument deny the co-existence of God and Evil, the evidential affirm the possible co-existence of God and Evil but doubts God’s existence due to the degree of evil in the world (Evans & Manis, 2010). For Inwagen, the two arguments are historical and philosophers have shifted their concentration on the evidential problem of evil. He offers a solution in a form of a counter argument based on courtroom scenario whereby innocence of a culprit is not logically consistent with evidence. 

For Inwagen, the two arguments should be divided into overall and limited classes which necessitate dissimilar answers. In the overall sense, for instance, the argument could be; if God exists, then there would be no evil in the world (universal) while in the limited sense it would be; if God exists, then there would be no this specific evil, for example, suffering in the world. He says that even if a person had a real answer to the universal argument, he would not automatically have a real answer to any limited argument from evil. His point is that it does not follow that any known occurrence we encounter in the world is compatible with God’s existence. Inwagen employs vagueness as a way of solving the problem of evil. For him, God’s existence is harmonious with the existence of gratuitous evil. Evil is costless when its existence is neither indispensable for any recompensing good nor indispensable to stop something similarly evil or eviler. 

Russell’s Moral critique of Christianity and its Relationship to the Problem of Evil

Bertrand Rusell’s moral critique of Christianity came as a response to the claim that was levied on him becoming less opposed to religious orthodoxy, which was not true. He had a firm stand that Christianity as a religion is both untrue and harmful in so far as cause-effect argument is concerned (Russel, 1953). For Rusell, individuals believe in God because of their background childhood orientation and for security reasons. They feel that there is someone superior that they are related to who will take care of them (Russel, 1953). Christianity, therefore, is founded under a belief that is engendered through fear which in reality is not good, hence making it untrue and detrimental. For example, Christianity exhibits pure fear of the divine, fear of downfall and fear of losing life. For this reason, Russell affirms that fear is the genesis or rather the father of evil and this explains why Christianity and evil walk abreast (Russel, 1953).

His objections to Christianity are in a twofold realm; rational and moral. He believes that Christianity is the influential cause or moral obstacle in the world, and that the Thomistic intellectual proof for God’s existence which disregards the use of reason is unattainable. Russel refutes the traditional Aristotelian arguments which the Christian proof of God is levied. His position is not that there is no God but that people cannot know whether he exists. For this reason, he cannot ascend to believe in his existence since it cannot be established with outright certainty. Morally, Russel does not agree that Jesus who is the foundation of Christianity’s morality was the wisest and ever best existed individual because he did not calculate his time of return well and talked of eternal punishment (Russel, 1953). In the same line of breath, he does not believe in the immortality of the soul. However, he affirms the existence of God (even though it cannot be known) and the existence of evil which can be eradicated when people keep away from fear.

Explanation by Lycan and Schlesinger and on how Russell’s arguments apply to a     critique of Pascal

Pascal’s critique exhorts that we should embrace safety even if we cannot arrive to the knowledge of God’s existence than being remorseful at the end. For him, either God does exist or he does not, and either people believe or they don’t (Evans & Manis, 2010).  For him, it is rational to have a belief in God even without evidence. If God does exist, then those who believe will cherish eternal happiness and confront eternal punishment. Equally if God does not exist, then those who believe in him will enjoy limited happiness before dying together with atheists. In a nutshell, Pascal’s critique is a subject of choices which intellectualists refute; for them is unbearable to embrace a belief just because one decided to. For instance, one cannot choose to believe that the sky is red just because he was offered some handsome ransom.

Denis Diderot objected Pascal’s view arguing that it is open even for Imam; religious practices are not a matter of decision theory, which gives no license for Pascal’s critique (Schlesinger, 1994). The view begs the question in favor of definite kind of theism (Allah and Yahweh). The evidential objection is that those who think in line with Pascal’s view are manipulative selfish people whom God may not accept hence will not be compensated at all. The argument seems to have roots in the nature of God. However, in response to this argument, it is considered that maybe God holds that right beliefs are commendable only if they are rooted in blameless evidence hence may not reward everyone (Saka, 2001). This still results to the objection of such gods. It will also be categorically absurd for God not to reward our decisions.

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