Answer

The Problem of Knowledge

The weight of the problem of knowledge becomes clear when one considers the conflicting epistemological accounts that philosophers present. Indeed, the manner the question of knowledge has been explored may sometimes make one question the validity of what is established as facts or truths. For instance, I can say I am in school now because I woke up and prepared myself knowing I am expected to be at school. Therefore, having woken up and prepared myself, there is no doubt that the only place I could go to was school. Quite naturally and under normal circumstances, I should have no doubt that I am in school. However, an epistemological exploration of the notion of knowledge might reveal that perhaps, after all, I did not come to school. Worse still, it may be presented that I am not at school because this is not a school, for there is no school in the first place. Such assertions are common in epistemological circles where the voices of philosophers like Descartes, Locke, and Hume among others have dominated the stage and as such shaped philosophy as is understood today.  In this construction I look at some of the presentations of these philosophers and weigh them against each other and by so doing indicate my position.

Descartes versus Locke

In the Meditations, Descartes makes a clean sweep of his beliefs and begins again. It is very interesting to follow through how he applies his method of doubt and proceeds to build knowledge on a new foundation. The first step in applying the method of doubt is to admit that all truths, whether established or otherwise, might not be truths after all. They could be unfounded assumptions or just mere statements that people have been deceived to believe are truths. According to him, even theists should doubt their belief that God exists (perhaps these are two truths in one for there is the truth that atheists believe in God and there is the truth that God exists). At this point we are not interested in knowing how many truths arise; rather the main point is to doubt everything. It does not matter what we have been taught in, for instance, physics or mathematics or religious studies. Everything should be doubted so that a new foundation of knowledge is established where following the doubting, a process begins to ascertain that all that we believe as being true can be proved to be ‘immune from skepticism’ (6).  In other words, a person should doubt everything first so that what is accepted in the end as truth is that which a person has herself/himself known to be certainly true. Even for some seemingly indisputable truths such as the laws of physics Descartes asserts they should be doubted because there is a possibility people have been deceived by some ‘evil genius’ that such laws are truths.

Descartes tries to build all knowledge upon priori where deductive reasoning takes central stage. Here, the ultimate truth is arrived at based on other truths but even such truths must be arrived at through deductive reasoning. For instance, it is possible that I am not typing any assignment because perhaps no assignment was given out. However, I can claim that indeed an assignment was issued because other classmates have said so, or because I have the printed instructions before me. According to Descartes, the classmates or printed instructions could as well be lies or dreams I am having, or perhaps I am being deceived by an evil genius. An implication here is that everything has to start with the mind where I must prove that I surely exist, God exists, and there is no evil genius who can deceive me (even about my own existence or that of God). After establishing that God exists and therefore i exist, I can make an inference that my classmates and the printed instructions are not dreams but part of reality. That way, I can even ascertain that my tutor exists. With that kind of deductive reasoning, I can ultimately arrive at the truth that I am typing this assignment. The deductive structure presented by Descartes is indeed interesting.

One wonders if Descartes’ rationalist account of external objects can withstand the criticisms of Locke’s empiricism. To a great extent, the answer to this is in the affirmative. According to Descartes, “…we have a clear idea of a thing when we are clearly aware of it, and we have a distinct idea of an object when we have full knowledge of its nature and the means by which it can be distinguished from other objects “(7). In as much as both Descartes and Locke strike some similar codes regarding innate ideas, they hold different views about knowledge and how it conceived. As concerns physical objects, Locke attempts to draw “a line about the things themselves and the way things appear to us”. He asserts that minds know their own ideas and knowledge of external objects is limited to the knowledge people have (in the mind) about the objects. Notably, this does not in any way conflict with Descartes’ assertion about external objects (see quote). There seems to be no ‘direct collision’ between the tow philosophers as quoted hence the affirmative answer. Arguably, Descartes’ account is more plausible especially considering that Locke fails to prove his proposition about ideas and knowledge in general. He seems not to realize that applying inductive reasoning might call for application of principles not drawn or carved from experience.

The problem of induction according to Hume

The problem of induction is grounded in the manner people associate repetitive or related events (with each other). The principle of universal causation gains relevance in the manner it postulates that “every event has a cause or a number of causes” (13). Based on the uniformity of nature, a notion is established that laws of nature will apply/hold in the future. That way, we are in a position to predict (even rightly) what will happen in the future. This is possible through the principle induction. Hume asserts that this principle cannot be said to be a relation of ideas. For instance, it may be predicted that the sun will set to the west. The problem here, according to Hume, is that this presentation cannot be proved, per se. The sun may have been observed to set to the west (and sure it will today or tomorrow) but there is no appeal to experience to prove this. There is no logical warrant in the assertion that because the sun has always set to the west it will do so today. Uniformity of nature is invoked here. Hume’s presentation is especially problematic for empiricist accounts of knowledge because there seems to be no association with experience (which empiricists claim is the source of all knowledge).

The principle of induction has to be founded upon impressions, but surely there is no impression as far as the uniformity of nature is concerned. Many inferences arrived at in the manner illustrated are arrived at through inductive reasoning. This is a very serious problem because employing inductive reasoning to justify inductive reasoning raises questions as to the validity and reliability of the principle being applied. It is like charging a corrupt judge in a corrupt court and as such trusting the verdict as being fair in all accounts, even without investigating whether the jury was influenced or bribed. Another illustration is using probability to confirm the ‘certainty’ of probability!