Answer

1. US National Interests

   Introduction

   The notion of “national interests” in the perspective of U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Syria continues to generate controversy among scholars. For instance, parametric studies by Belyaeva et al. (2018) alludes to this fact and acknowledges the lack of a clear policy statement that serves the country’s interests in letter and spirit. This paper draws from extant reviews to delineate four antecedents to the variations in opinion on the US interest in the two wars. These include legality of America’s interventions, The emergence of Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran alliance and Fatalities, Substantial gap between American national objectives and a realistic appreciation of the situation, and Lack of Clarity on the Expected Endstates of Iraq and Syrian Wars. Subsequent discourse affirms these differences, and attributes these differences to the aforestated issues.

   Legality of America’s interventions in Syria, and Iraq

   The conducts of the wars in Syria and Iraq which have persisted from 2011 continue to generate controversy while blurring America’s “national interest” as well. Available data on American policy cite the provision of support to “opposition alliances” to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as an overriding American interest (Beşkardeş, 2016). To this end, post-2012 data show that indirect support was extended to anti-regime fighters with regularity.  Yet, these wars are also believed to have contravened international laws as far protection of civilians, mostly women and children are concerned. Incidentally, the support which was also of economic nature has been offered covertly. However, the extent of U.S. assistance is not known (Beşkardeş, 2016). Indeed, an aggregation of “qualitative witness accounts, quantitative surveys and data-based counterfactuals” evidences by Renard (2015) confirms this fact, but argues that the provision of logistical support to the opposition resulted in a higher number of casualties in Syria and Iraq. This development effectively shrouds the objectives of the intervention in the first place. On the whole, however, in 2014, America’s interest in Syria and Iraq as vaguely articulated at the time had focused on the administration’s willingness to precautions to fight ISIL, in the interest of the United States (Beşkardeş, 2016). Despite this assurance, the legal issues’ surrounding the conduct of the twin wars renders the demarcation of US interest difficult, at best. 

   The Emergence of Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran Alliance and Fatalities

   Chronological data from Alliance (2020) have traced with great success, the origin the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts to the Arab Spring that swept through Middle East and North African countries in 2011. The wave which reached Syria in 2011, and Iraq shortly after, is directly associated with  an upsurge in sectarian violence, giving way to civil war, and further intensification of violence, as “rebel brigades were mobilized to fight for control of cities, towns and landscape by state forces” (Alliance, 2020). For instance, in Syria, the battle swiftly reached Damascus and Aleppo, the second city leading to 90,000 fatalities according to a 2013 estimate by the United Nations (Alliance, 2020). Various sources, including the United Nations show that the number of people killed had reached 250,000 by 2015 (Alliance, 2020). The same studies also attribute these fatalities to the emergence of Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran alliance, which have extended overt support to regimes in Damascus and Baghdad. The situation leads many observers to question America’s interest in Syria such a muddled drawn out war such morbid tallies. 

   Substantial Gap between American National Objectives and Realistic Appreciation of the Situation

   Several studies have raised concerns with the US policy particularly with the entry of Russia and Iran into the fray, and the out of control fighting which has weakened opposition forces in both Syria and Iraq and a resurgence of ISIL. The resultant scenario has led many scholars to question America’s strategic interest in the two wars (Jenkins, 2015). It is telling that this debacle was witnessed despite substantial US support for opposition fighters , and ISIL gained ground extending their caliphates to large portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq (Jenkins, 2015). Despite heavy shelling from the United States and her Western and Middle Eastern allies, ISIL still registered real success in conquering new territories in urban areas, buoyed by foreign powers which facilitate recruitments of fighters. This development continues to complicate contemporary understanding of US interest as the country considers whether to escalate the war or withdraw altogether. Yet, continued calls by the ISIL hierarchy to its global membership to unleash terror on American interests continue to be a source of concern (Jenkins, 2015).

   Lack of Clarity on the Expected Endstates of Iraq and Syrian Wars

   There is general consensus in academia that America’s incursion into Iraq and Syria represents a failure in the delimitation of the country’s national interest. While a case study by Cordesman (2016) concedes to some level of success, victory is far from certain. This is because the possibility of “tipping the balance” to realize limited tactical objective of emasculating ISIL to the extent that the organization is incapable of administering any “major cities or blocs of territory” is difficult to pull off. While some admit that the United States has been largely successful in achieving this objective, ISIL’s capacity to evolve and its complex ideological war still presents a challenge. In addition, America’s “victory” remains feeble and constricted, as it ignores pertinent contextual issues such as the role of the Russia-Iraq-Syria-Iran axis in the conflict and their potential to sponsor terror to US interests in the region (Cordesman, 2016). Moreover, America’s ambiguous “interests” in twin costly and unpopular wars cannot be effectively demarcated as the threat to terrorism form ISIL, or a future offshoot is not impossible. Evidently, these possibilities do not exclude ISIL’s ability to regain control of urban centers, confederacies, and channels of “fundraising, training terrorists and fighters”, and for perpetuation of radical Islamic views. In light of the above, it may be realistic to conclude that the prospects of American victory, which yields a near term victory in “either the broader strategic sense of fully defeating ISIS, or in the grand strategic sense of ending a war with a stable and desirable outcome” is not possible in the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, America’s interest in the two wars are difficult to pinpoint, and offers insight into America’s failure to learn from her past: the true definition of American interest in Syria and Iraq lie in its ability to chart a strategy that takes care of vital interests after the shelling has stopped, and the guns have gone silent.

   Conclusion

   Conclusively, four variables have been identified and discussed in light of their mediating impacts on the way national interest is understood from the wars in Iraq and Syria. Subsequently, the four factors, namely, legality of America’s interventions, the emergence of Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran alliance and fatalities, substantial gap between American national objectives and a realistic appreciation of the situation, and lack of clarity on the expected end states of Iraq and Syrian wars have been found to significantly define America’s interest in the aforestated wars.